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ABSTRACT 
  When a disaster strikes the United States, Congress typically feels 
heavy pressure to enact legislation, including tax legislation, to 
provide relief. This Article discusses features of two tax legislative 
initiatives, which responded to two quite different disasters: first, the 
response to the devastation of the fall 2005 hurricane season and, 
then, the response to the earlier terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon of September 11, 2001. The Article first raises 
the possibility that some of the provisions of these acts may be 
vulnerable to indirect constitutional challenge under the Uniformity 
Clause. In examining some of the problems inherent in post-disaster 
tax legislation, it discusses the role, usually unfortunate, of sympathy 
in tax legislation. It goes on to consider how, despite the fact that the 
targets of relief legislation are generally thought to be people in need, 
it nevertheless seems to be the case that a good deal of the benefits of 
disaster legislation in the tax area goes to relatively high-income and 
high-wealth taxpayers. It asks whether a better approach can be 
institutionalized. It suggests that Congress identify those provisions 
enacted in response to the recent disasters that make sense generally, 
such as five-year carryback of net operating losses, and amend the tax 
code to adopt these rules generally. It further recommends that 
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Congress identify those provisions needed in particular when a whole 
area is devastated—a five-year period for replacing destroyed 
property, credit for wages to pre-disaster employees, and routine 
extensions of filing deadlines—and make them available to any 
declared disaster area. It urges as well two kinds of longer-term 
approaches. One is to consider and evaluate disaster tax relief 
provisions as a kind of national insurance against disasters that the 
private market does not supply. The other is to develop off-the-shelf 
provisions to be activated when a disaster strikes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, when a disaster strikes the United States, 
whether a natural disaster such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or an 
unnatural disaster such as the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon in 2001, Congress typically feels heavy pressure to enact 
legislation to provide relief. Among the tools available to Congress in 
discharging these perceived obligations is the Internal Revenue Code 
(I.R.C.). But there are substantial problems with the tax legislative 
solutions Congress typically crafts under these circumstances. 
First, any relief comes slowly, for the federal legislative process is 
not built for speed. Congress must be in session, or called into one if it 
is not. Bills must be drafted, considered, and approved by the relevant 
committees—in the case of tax legislation, the House Ways and 
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Care must be 
taken to comply with special rules that apply to tax legislation.1 After 
debate and vote in each house, the bills must ordinarily be considered 
by a conference committee to resolve differences between the House 
and Senate versions, and then each house must separately approve 
the conference version of the bill.2 Finally, the president must find a 
free moment in the Rose Garden for the signing ceremony, at which 
 
 1. For example, the Constitution requires that revenue legislation originate in the House 
of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. Also, the Senate has imposed supermajority 
requirements on legislation that would permanently lose revenue under the so-called “Byrd 
Rule,” which was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as section 313 and 
made permanent in 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13214, 104 Stat. 1388-621, 1388-621  to 1388-622 
(1990) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2000)). 
 2. See JURISDICTION OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND HISTORICAL NOTE, 
H.R. REP. NO. 108-810, § C (2005), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/About. 
asp?section=23 (“The committee on Ways and Means has responsibility for raising the revenue 
required to finance the federal government. This includes individual and corporate income 
taxes, excise taxes, estate taxes, gift taxes, and other miscellaneous taxes.”). 
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point the congressional work is finished, except perhaps for the 
technical corrections bill that will follow to fix the errors that seem 
unavoidably to infect the process, especially when done in haste.3 
Second, when Congress does eventually take action, it tends to 
overreact. There appears to be a legislative imperative, a felt need to 
be seen by constituents as engaged actively in providing whatever 
relief or succor within the imagination of Congress, and within fairly 
elastic budgetary constraints. In such an atmosphere, the powerful 
House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees are likely to 
assert their role, involving tax benefits as an element of any disaster 
relief package. Moreover, indirect relief through special tax 
provisions, known as tax expenditures,4 may be perceived, however 
inaccurately, as both self-executing and less costly than direct 
governmental grants. 
This congressional imperative is encouraged by the fact that the 
IRS, at least in its own view, lacks statutory authority to provide 
certain types of relief, no matter how much such relief seems merited 
by the circumstances. Finally, because post-disaster tax legislation is 
 
 3. For example, just prior to passage, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act was amended to 
include a large technical corrections title. Pub. L. No. 109-135, §§ 401–413, 119 Stat. 2577 (2005) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.). Section 403 clarifies key rules relating to 
alternative minimum tax elections and effective dates for nondeferred compensation plans, 
provides technical corrections to the U.S. production activities deduction, and spells out other 
technical corrections related to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (an act which was 
corrected prior in the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2004). 
 4. Tax expenditures are “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws 
which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a 
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 297 (1974). See generally 
STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985). The Joint 
Committee on Taxation has explained, “[s]pecial income tax provisions are referred to as tax 
expenditures because they may be considered to be analogous to direct outlay programs, and 
the two can be considered as alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy 
objectives.” STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 2 (Comm. Print 2006). The 
Government Accountability Office recently undertook a study of tax expenditures and found 
that “[s]ince 1974, the number of tax expenditures more than doubled and the sum of tax 
expenditure revenue loss estimates tripled in real terms to nearly $730 billion in 2004.” U.S. 
GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL 
FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED, at first unnumbered page (2005), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05690.pdf. For 2006, the Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimated the cost of the mortgage interest deduction at $69.4 billion and the exclusion 
from income for employer contributions for health insurance premiums and related exclusions 
at $90.6 billion. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 33, 39 (Comm. Print 2006). 
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typically viewed as something that will almost certainly pass Congress 
by wide margins, it can be an attractive place to put provisions that an 
individual legislator or interest group wants enacted, but which would 
be controversial if offered in any other context. 
But while the forces inclining Congress to enact post-disaster tax 
legislation are compelling, the legislative output that results (we will 
argue) has been disappointing, and largely inconsistent with sound tax 
policy. Curiously, the usual explanations of why legislation may be 
inconsistent with optimal public policy do not seem to apply in this 
situation. Conventional public-choice analysis—a currently popular 
and usually reliable source of why legislation goes bad—emphasizes 
self-interest as the moving force in political processes. Elected 
officials seek first and foremost to assure their own reelection.5 That 
may involve actions that appeal to their constituents,6 but even when 
it does, that is simply viewed as a case in which the self-interests of 
the constituents achieve congruence with those of the legislator, more 
or less accidentally.7 
Ironically, disaster-relief legislation typically embodies a large 
and undeniable element of genuine altruism, at least on the part of 
the general public. A legislator representing South Dakota knows—as 
do her constituents—that South Dakota is unlikely to be devastated 
by a hurricane,8 and unlikely as well to be a prime target of terrorist 
attacks. The legislator also knows, however, that her support of relief 
measures for disasters of those types will be popular with her 
constituents. Unfortunately, the temporary displacement of self-
interest by altruism does not seem to produce better legislation; it just 
produces legislation that is bad in different ways. 
 
 5. As Professors Farber and Frickey have put it, legislators are portrayed in this literature 
as “single-minded seekers of reelection.” DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND 
PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 20 (1991) (quoting D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE 
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 5 (1974)). 
 6. Or, equally relevant, the legislators’ actions may appeal to their campaign contributors, 
who may or may not be among their constituents. 
 7. FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
 8. No state is completely free from natural disaster risks, but the risks faced by South 
Dakota are probably largely from tornadoes, whose damage can be intense, but never 
approaches the scale of major hurricanes, and thus never receives the degree of legislative 
attention under discussion here. See Allen Kenney, JCT Staff Member Suggests Automatic 
Provisions for Disaster Relief, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 2, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 211-6 
(citing Thomas Barthold of the Joint Committee on Taxation, who noted in a speech that recent 
tornadoes in Missouri caused intense devastation, but no legislation). 
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Although altruism may play a refreshing role in motivating 
Congress to enact post-disaster tax legislation, such legislation 
nonetheless needs to be tested against the standard criteria for good 
tax policy: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and economic efficiency.9 
Horizontal equity requires treating those similarly situated in the 
same way so “those with equal ability to pay taxes should pay equal 
amounts of tax.”10 Vertical equity requires treating those differently 
situated differently so that “people with greater income . . . pay 
greater amounts of that income in tax.”11 Efficiency “requires that a 
tax interfere as little as possible with people’s economic behavior.”12 
These tax criteria demand that, whatever the role of the federal 
government in expressing sympathy to victims on behalf of the 
nation, any expression should be designed not to burden the poor, 
favor the rich, or fail to achieve its economic goals. 
We begin in Part I by discussing features of two tax legislative 
initiatives, which responded to two quite different disasters: first, the 
response to the devastation of the fall 2005 hurricane season and, 
then, the response to the earlier terrorist attacks on the World Trade 
Center and Pentagon of September 11, 2001. In Part II, we explore 
the possibility that some of the provisions of these acts may be 
vulnerable to indirect constitutional challenge under the Uniformity 
Clause.13 Part III examines some of the problems inherent in post-
disaster tax legislation. This Part first discusses the role, usually 
unfortunate, of sympathy in tax legislation. It goes on to consider 
how, despite the fact that the targets of relief legislation are generally 
thought to be people in need, it nevertheless seems that a sizable 
share of the benefits of disaster legislation in the tax area goes to 
relatively high-income and high-wealth taxpayers. Part IV suggests 
 
 9. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27–29 (5th ed. 2005). 
 10. Id. at 27. The scholarly debate about the validity and usefulness of these criteria is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 11. Id. at 28. 
 12. Id. Professors Graetz and Schenk continue: 
A tax often is said to be efficient when it promotes economic growth and inefficient 
when it inhibits such growth. Finally, efficiency sometimes refers to the extent to 
which incentive provisions provide benefits to taxpayers other than the intended 
beneficiaries. Where, for example, an unintended third party receives a benefit, or 
where the intended beneficiary receives less than the government loses in tax 
revenue, the tax provision is said to be inefficient. 
Id. at 29. 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“All Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States.”). 
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that a better approach can be institutionalized by incorporating some 
of the legislative and administrative measures that we think have 
proven appropriate and helpful. We conclude by offering our 
speculation regarding ways in which the incentive structure might be 
altered to encourage only relief actions that seem likely to promote 
good policy, both in terms of disaster relief and tax policy. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO RECENT DISASTERS 
Much can be learned from the congressional response to two 
recent disasters: the 2005 hurricane season (including Hurricane 
Katrina) and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We do not 
attempt a comprehensive analysis here of the several tax enactments 
spawned by these two disasters. Rather, we have chosen a few 
representative features of each that illustrate Congress’s unfortunate 
tendency to disregard sound tax policy criteria when responding to 
disasters. 
With respect to hurricane relief, the shortcomings primarily 
implicate horizontal equity concerns between taxpayers within and 
without the designated geographic zones. With respect to the 
terrorist-attack response, the primary problem relates to a confused 
application of the special tax rules designed for military personnel to 
civilian disaster victims. In both cases, other concerns are identified as 
well. 
A. The Three Sisters: Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma 
1. Catastrophe and Response.  The congressional reaction to the 
devastation wreaked by the 2005 hurricane season illustrates several 
of the troublesome tendencies noted in the introduction. The 
immense scale of the damage done by Hurricane Katrina created an 
urgency that presumably led Congress to move on legislative relief as 
quickly as it reasonably could; nevertheless, the legislative process 
was glacial in comparison to the dire needs developing on the ground. 
Hurricane Katrina hit the Louisiana and Mississippi coastline on 
August 29, 2005.14 Two weeks passed without legislative action; the 
Senate then slightly beat the House to the draw, introducing S. 1696 
 
 14. Transcript of Anderson Cooper 360 (CNN television broadcast Aug. 29, 2005), 
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/29/acd.01.html. 
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on September 13.15 The following day, H.R. 3768 was introduced.16 
Two days later, both bills passed their respective houses.17 To shorten 
the process, however, the Senate later that day voted to adopt the 
House bill, but with some amendments. Further amendments 
followed, but without formal conference committee consideration.18 
Both the House and the Senate passed resolutions on September 21 
adopting the final provisions of the Katrina Emergency Tax Relief 
Act (KETRA).19 The enormous strength of the legislative imperative 
mentioned above is demonstrated by the fact that, though this bill was 
in many ways ill-considered, it passed both houses unanimously.20 
Apparently, even the most maverick legislators, from the safest seats, 
did not want to arm their next opponents with the charge that they 
tried to block assistance to the victims of this horrific disaster. 
The bill was signed by the president two days later, on 
September 23. Less than a month thus passed between the disaster 
and the tax Act designed to address it. This is remarkably swift by the 
standards of tax legislation; still, it demonstrates that tax legislation 
can never be much of a first responder in a crisis. 
As it happened, however, the hurricane season was far from 
over. Even as Congress finally approved, and the president signed, 
KETRA, Hurricane Rita was approaching the Gulf Coast, making 
landfall in Texas and Louisiana on September 24.21 And a month after 
that, Hurricane Wilma—which at times carried the National Weather 
Service’s highest hurricane designation, Category Five—circled the 
Gulf, eventually hitting the west coast of Florida, where it caused 
extensive damage. Congress went back to work—again, at a pace that 
one would say was quick for legislation, but slow for disaster relief—
and passed (through both houses) the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 
 
 15. S. 1696, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 16. H.R. 3768, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 17. S. 1696 (as passed by Senate); H.R. 3768 (as passed by House of Representatives). 
 18. E.g., S. 1728, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 19. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, 119 Stat. 
2016 (2005). 
 20. 151 Cong. Rec. H8197 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2005); 151 Cong. Rec. S10320 (daily ed. Sept. 
21, 2005). 
 21. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER, TROPICAL CYCLONE 
REPORT: HURRICANE RITA 2 (2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL182005_Rita.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2006). 
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2005 (GOZA)22 on December 16, 2005. The president signed it on 
December 21.23 
GOZA accomplished several things: it expanded the 
geographical reach of the KETRA provisions to areas damaged by 
the two subsequent hurricanes;24 it added several important 
investment incentive provisions that had apparently not occurred to 
Congress when it passed KETRA;25 and it offered technical 
corrections to several earlier tax bills, including the Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,26 the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004,27 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005.28 
KETRA and GOZA certainly deserve to be called disaster acts, 
but the adjective should be understood to refer more to the Acts 
themselves than to the hurricanes that spawned them. As can be seen 
from the description below, the provisions of the two Acts are, with 
only a few exceptions, a sad combination of ineffective disaster relief 
and poor tax policy. 
2. Provisions of the Acts.   
a. Qualified Plan Withdrawals.  KETRA’s section 101, the first 
substantive section of the first Act, seems a logical place to begin.29 It 
allows an individual who, on August 28, 2005, lived in the Hurricane 
 
 22. The accepted style of shorthand references to this Act seems to be “GO Zone Act,” 
but we have used the shorter acronym because it is shorter, and because it sounds more like a 
piece of legislation and less like a cheerleader’s exhortation. 
 23. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GOZA), Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (2005). 
 24. Some provisions apply variously to areas hit by each storm, a technical choice that has 
spawned a bewildering variety of zone names, including “Gulf Opportunity Zone,” “Hurricane 
Katrina disaster area,” “Rita GO Zone,” “Hurricane Rita disaster area,” “Wilma GO Zone,” 
and “Hurricane Wilma disaster area.” In all cases, the boundaries of these areas or zones were 
to be defined essentially by presidential proclamation. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 
4440, THE “GULF OPPORTUNITY ZONE ACT OF 2005,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE (Comm. Print 2005). 
 25. See infra Part I.A.2.e. Technically, GOZA extends several of KETRA’s provisions by 
repealing them as of December 21, 2005 (GOZA’s effective date) and reenacting them as part 
of GOZA. To be as clear as possible about what Congress did, and when it did it, however, we 
will refer to the KETRA provisions when discussing the provisions first introduced into law by 
that Act. 
 26. GOZA § 405 (amending the Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003). 
 27. GOZA § 403 (amending the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004). 
 28. GOZA § 402 (amending the Energy Policy Act of 2005). 
 29. As is typically true, the Act begins with sections giving the Act its name, and providing 
definitions. Section 101 is the first section that effects any changes to the prevailing tax rules. 
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Katrina disaster area to make withdrawals from various retirement 
accounts, such as plans established under I.R.C. sections 401(k), 
403(b), or 457, under favorable terms. First, the usual 10 percent 
penalty on premature withdrawals would be waived.30 Second, any 
income produced by the withdrawals (which are ordinarily taxable in 
full) would be included ratably over a three-year period (rather than 
fully includible in the year of distribution, as is generally the rule).31 
Finally, any amounts withdrawn pursuant to this provision could be 
recontributed to the plan at any time within three years of the 
distributions (which is not normally allowed with respect to any 
distributions, much less premature ones).32 The Act imposes a few 
limits: no more than $100,000 could be withdrawn under this 
provision; and only withdrawals between August 25, 2005, and 
December 31, 2006 could qualify. 
As an emergency relief provision, the provision was unlikely to 
be helpful. Many of the victims, including those whose situations were 
most desperate, (1) would not have such accounts; (2) could not find 
their financial institutions even if they did have such accounts during 
the weeks and months following the disaster; and (3) likely did not 
have the specter of modest premature withdrawal penalties at the top 
of their list of worries at any time. 
But as time passed, some progress was made in dealing with the 
disaster. People presumably began to be able to locate their various 
accounts (if they had them), and may well have found one or more of 
the KETRA provisions useful. But, though that was Congress’s clear 
intention, it raises an unavoidable horizontal equity question: Why 
should taxpayers whose losses resulted from this particular hurricane 
be more favorably treated than those whose losses resulted from a 
different catastrophe? 
b. Casualty Loss Deductions.  Before making a head-to-head 
comparison between hypothetical victims inside and outside the 
favored zones, consider another provision of KETRA: section 402, 
which suspends, for losses attributable to Hurricane Katrina, the 
limits on casualty loss deductions. These deductions normally allow 
deduction of losses only to the extent that such losses exceed ten 
 
 30. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 101(b)(2), 
119 Stat. 2016 (2005). 
 31. KETRA § 101(c)(1). 
 32. KETRA § 101(c)(2)–(3). 
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percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income (AGI) in the year of 
the casualty.33 This limitation has had the effect of virtually 
eliminating eligibility to claim casualty loss deductions for most 
taxpayers since its inception in 1983.34 
Again, there is reason to question the effectiveness of this 
provision as disaster relief. First, casualty loss deductions are only 
available to those who itemize their deductions, a group which 
consists of only about a third of all taxpayers,35 and probably a smaller 
percentage of Katrina victims, because they were disproportionately 
poor, while itemizers are disproportionately well-off.36 Second, there 
was not much need to worry about deductions on an emergency basis, 
because taxpayers would generally not even be thinking about tax 
filings until six months or more after the disaster.37 Finally, the ten 
percent limitation was generally less important for Katrina victims, 
because their losses were of such a magnitude that they likely would 
greatly exceed ten percent of AGI in many cases, especially among 
those that seem most deserving of special relief.38 
 
 33. KETRA also suspended an apparently trivial limitation allowing deduction only of 
losses exceeding $100 per casualty event. KETRA § 402. For personal casualty losses and theft 
losses attributed to Hurricane Katrina there is no $100 minimum or 10 percent AGI limitation 
under section 402 of KETRA (excluding restrictions in paragraphs (1) and (2)(A) of section 
165(h)). Id. 
 34. In 1982, the last year preceding introduction of this limit, about 2.2 million taxpayers 
claimed casualty loss deductions. In the following year, when taxpayers were subject to the 10 
percent limitation, only about 200,000 taxpayers claimed such deductions. Susan Hostetter & 
Dan Holik, Preliminary Income and Tax Statistics for 1983 Individual Income Tax Returns, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, Winter 1984–1985, at 19, 21. 
 35. Itemized deductions were claimed on 33.7 percent of all returns fled in 2003. Internal 
Revenue Service, Tax Stats at a Glance, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=102886,00.html 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2006). 
 36. It is true, of course, that a deduction for a disaster loss of significant magnitude will 
alter a taxpayer’s decision on the question of whether or not to itemize deductions. 
 37. See KETRA § 403 (extending filing deadlines for victims of Hurricane Katrina). 
 38. The prototypical pre-1983 casualty was the loss due to collision involving a personal 
automobile. If a taxpayer with an AGI of $80,000 totals a car worth $10,000, the casualty loss 
limitation disallows the first $8000 of that loss, permitting deduction of only the last $2000, or 20 
percent in this example. If a Katrina victim with the same income loses a $150,000 house, 
$50,000 of furnishings and personal effects, and a $10,000 automobile, the $210,000 total losses 
would have been mostly allowable even without the changes effected by section 402. Only the 
same $8000 would have been disallowed, with the balance of $202,000 being allowed, or 96 
percent in this example. In the latter case, the effect of the casualty losses in excess of income 
would be to allow carryovers of the losses to subsequent years, subject to the rules of I.R.C. § 
172. 
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c. Illustrating the Inequity.  But, at least for a taxpayer who was 
reasonably well-off, having perhaps both a substantial section 401(k) 
balance, and an income high enough to justify itemizing his 
deductions, this pair of KETRA provisions could produce some 
significant benefits. Imagine, for example, a single taxpayer with an 
income of $90,000, who was perhaps at the periphery of the Katrina 
disaster area, and sustained only $10,000 of damage to his house from 
a wind-blown tree. He would be allowed to deduct the entire $10,000 
of damages, and would be able to withdraw from his section 401(k) 
plan the $10,000 necessary to repair the damage. This withdrawal 
would be subject to no penalty tax, and would produce no net taxable 
income if the individual were able to recontribute the amount back to 
his section 401(k) plan within three years. Even if he does not 
recontribute, his withdrawal would result in no more than $3333 of 
income in the year of distribution. 
One must wonder why the benefits—if appropriate in this case—
are not more broadly available to others who are similarly situated. In 
the extreme case, imagine another taxpayer identically situated in 
every respect except his choice of residence—a taxpayer, perhaps, 
who lived in Minnesota, nowhere near the disaster area, and had a 
weakened tree blow over on her house, causing an identical $10,000 
of damage. This taxpayer will find that if she withdraws $10,000 from 
her section 401(k) plan, that amount will be included in her income in 
the year of the distribution; and she will pay an additional excise tax 
of $1000 for violating the rules discouraging premature withdrawals. 
She will also find that, because her income (including the amount of 
the premature distribution) is $100,000, all of the $10,000 casualty loss 
will be absorbed by the statutory nondeductible floor of ten percent 
of AGI. The combination of the extra $10,000 of income, the absence 
of the $10,000 casualty-loss deduction, and the premature withdrawal 
penalty tax will mean that the Minnesota taxpayer will pay about 
$6000 more tax in 2005 than the taxpayer who lived in the Katrina 
area39—an amount that results in, under reasonable assumptions, 
about a 76 percent larger tax bill than the Louisiana taxpayer faced.40 
 
 39. Married taxpayers with an AGI of $100,000 would be in the 25 percent tax bracket. 
I.R.C. § 1(a)(1) (2000) (as adjusted for inflation). The extra $20,000 of income would thus be 
associated with an additional tax of $5000. This, plus the $1000 early withdrawal penalty, equals 
$6000. 
 40. Married taxpayers with two children would have paid a federal income tax of $7850 if 
their AGI was $100,000, they had $20,000 of non-casualty itemized deductions, and a $10,000 
casualty deduction. $6000 is 76.4 percent of $7850. 
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The two taxpayers suffered precisely the same damage during 2005—
$10,000 of structural damage to their homes due to a wind-blown tree. 
One has to ask: Why should their tax treatment be so dramatically 
different? 
It is possible to justify the KETRA provisions as to casualty 
losses and emergency withdrawals from retirement accounts, in the 
sense that they do not seem, by themselves, outrageous rules: If one’s 
house is suddenly damaged by a storm, perhaps rules allowing full 
deductibility of the damages, and tax-free borrowing from one’s 
retirement account to cover the repairs, are merciful, even sensible. 
On the other hand, it is possible to justify, on different grounds, the 
more stringent background rules as to casualty losses and premature 
withdrawals that would apply to the Minnesota taxpayer: rules 
imposing nondeductible floors on casualty loss deductions expand the 
tax base without gross injustice to those suffering modest losses, and 
penalizing premature withdrawals from retirement accounts serves to 
protect those accounts for later achievement of their intended 
purposes. But it is virtually impossible to justify treating two so nearly 
identically situated taxpayers so differently. 
d. Other KETRA Provisions.  Although too numerous to 
examine individually, most of the other KETRA provisions also seem 
rather capriciously limited to the Katrina disaster zone. They are 
rules that either make sense everywhere, or make sense nowhere. 
They are not, for the most part, provisions that make sense only 
because of some unique characteristic of the Katrina disaster. Two 
more abbreviated examples will illustrate this point. 
First, KETRA provides an especially favorable mileage rate for 
purposes of deductions related to charitable uses of a personal 
automobile.41 The general mileage rate that taxpayers may deduct for 
use of a personal automobile for charitable purposes is set by statute 
at 14 cents per mile.42 In contrast, the rate for business use of a 
personal automobile is permitted by regulation to vary according to 
prevailing costs of fuel, oil, and other commodities, and is set by 
periodic announcement by the IRS.43 For roughly the period covered 
by KETRA, the mileage rate allowed for business use of a personal 
 
 41. Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 303, 119 
Stat. 2016 (2005). 
 42. I.R.C. § 170(i) (2000). 
 43. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(g) (as amended in 2003). 
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automobile was 48.5 cents per mile.44 Congress’s explanation of the 
difference is that business use of the automobile should be fully 
compensated through a deduction of all costs, including maintenance, 
depreciation, and the like, while only out-of-pocket costs, such as the 
cost of gasoline, are appropriate charitable deductions.45 Why this 
should be so is not self-evident, but justification could perhaps be 
found in the income-defining properties of business-expense 
deductions. Charitable contribution deductions, in contrast, may be 
more properly a matter of legislative grace. 
Whatever the reasons for distinguishing business from charitable 
uses of an automobile for purposes of deducting the vehicle costs, 
KETRA blatantly disregards them by allowing a deduction for 
charitable use of a personal automobile—but only within the disaster 
zone—at a rate equal to 70 percent of the applicable business rate 
prevailing at the time—amounting to about 34 cents per mile during 
the fall of 2005.46 If charitable contributions are indeed a matter of 
legislative grace, then perhaps one should accept grace when and how 
one finds it.47 Still, it is difficult to understand how someone who 
drives from Cincinnati to help rebuild a flooded church in southern 
Mississippi deserves a more generous deduction than if that person 
had driven to Alabama to help rebuild a church destroyed by fire.48 
 
 44. Rev. Proc. 2005-78, 2005-51 I.R.B. 1177. This rate was in effect from September 1, 2005, 
through December 30, 2005; KETRA was in effect from August 25, 2005, until it was 
superseded by GOZA (with this provision intact) on December 21, 2005. 
 45. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
OF H.R. 3768, THE “KATRINA EMERGENCY TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2005,”AS PASSED BY THE 
HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON SEPT. 21, 2005 (Comm. Print 2005) (addressing section 303 of 
KETRA). 
 46. KETRA § 303. The section following allows exclusion of any reimbursement of mileage 
costs in excess of 14 cents, which, under ordinarily applicable provisions, would be included in 
income. 
 47. Recall here the parable of the laborers in the vineyards, who are paid the same, 
regardless of how long they had worked; grace is thus within the discretion of He who bestows 
it. Matthew 20:1–16. 
 48. One might argue that Congress is simply trying to provide particularly powerful 
incentives to rebuild the hurricane disaster area because of the extent of the devastation. That 
may be an accurate description of congressional motives in enacting this provision, but it is 
contrary to the nearly universal refusal to use variable charitable deductions to create 
hierarchies among objects of charity. A dollar given to an opera company, for example, is 
deductible on precisely the same terms as a dollar given to a soup kitchen, even though relief of 
hunger for food would presumably take precedence over relief of hunger for arias in the minds 
of most members of Congress (and most voters). The focus of I.R.C. § 170 (which allows 
charitable contributions deductions) is on what the donor gives up, not on the worthiness of the 
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Second, KETRA adds another exception to the general tax rule 
requiring recognition of income from the discharge of indebtedness.49 
Even if the taxpayer is not insolvent (a usual requirement of the 
exception from debt discharge income rule in I.R.C. section 108), no 
recognition is required if the taxpayer resides within the Katrina 
disaster area.50 Again, one can imagine broader exceptions to the 
rules regarding income from debt discharge, such as, hypothetically, 
allowing exclusion whenever the property securing indebtedness is 
destroyed by agents external to the taxpayer. It is, however, difficult 
to justify applying such a rule in only one geographical area. To any 
particular taxpayer, an uninsured loss of a major piece of property is 
likely a disaster, whether it happens in an officially designated 
disaster area or not. 
e. GOZA Investment Incentives.  Except for a few provisions 
allowing credits for wage payments, KETRA was not particularly 
generous with corporate entities, targeting most of its benefits at 
individuals instead.51 GOZA, in contrast, is loaded with provisions 
granting tax favors of a variety of sorts to business interests in a 
variety of industries. A cynic might conclude that this was due to 
 
charity (as long as the donee meets the definitional standards for eligible recipients of 
deductible contributions). 
 49. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2000). The idea behind income from discharge of indebtedness is 
that an increase in net worth generates income, and that net worth can be increased by a 
reduction of a taxpayer’s liabilities, just as it would be by an increase in the taxpayer’s assets. 
 50. But there is a nice exception-within-an-exception here: if the discharged debt relates to 
property outside the Katrina disaster area, then this exception does not apply. KETRA § 401. 
 51. Normally, the work opportunity tax credit provides to the employer a credit in the 
amount of 40 percent of the first $6000 of qualified work wages per employee, amounting to a 
maximum credit of $2400, for hiring individuals from various target groups, e.g., families eligible 
for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, high-risk youths, ex-felons. Section 201 of 
KETRA extends this credit to employers who hire a Hurricane Katrina employee, defined as: 
(1) any individual who on August 28, 2005, had a principal place of abode in the core 
disaster area and who is hired during the [two]-year period beginning on such date for 
a position[,] the principal place of employment of which is located in the core disaster 
area, and (2) any individual who on [August 28, 2005,] had a principal place of abode 
in the core disaster area, who [was] displaced from such abode by reason of 
Hurricane Katrina and who is hired during the period beginning on such date and 
ending on December 31, 2005 without regard to whether the new principal place of 
employment is in the core disaster area.  
KETRA § 201. 
In addition, section 202 of KETRA provides a credit of 40 percent of qualified wages (up 
to a maximum of $6000 in qualified wages per employee) for the those employers who 
conducted a trade or business within the core disaster area who retained their employees that 
worked for them in their trade or business. 
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another source of delay inherent in the enactment of legislative 
solutions: it takes the lobbyists some time to figure out what they 
need, and how best to get it. Alliances must be formed, and 
compromises must be reached. But one need not be a cynic to 
recognize that crafting appropriate incentive structures to rebuild a 
completely devastated area takes some time. In any event, by 
December 2005, Congress had enacted in GOZA provisions to 
benefit a broad range of interests. Utilities, timber interests, oil and 
gas producers, and even colleges and universities all will benefit from 
one or more of the GOZA provisions.52 Some of those provisions 
have a retrospective quality, in the sense that they are intended to 
relieve the pain of the losses suffered; but some are primarily 
prospective, offering incentives for new investment to rebuild the 
areas affected by all three hurricanes. 
These incentives take several forms. First, there is a special 50 
percent depreciation allowance for qualifying investments to 
rehabilitate or reconstruct hurricane-damaged property.53 This means 
that in addition to whatever depreciation deductions might be 
available for the particular type of property placed in service, the 
taxpayer may deduct an amount equal to fifty percent of the 
investment in the new or rehabilitated asset. Alternatively, if the 
taxpayer elects to expense (that is, to deduct immediately, in the year 
the cost was incurred) certain investments under I.R.C. section 179, 
he may expense up to $200,000 of investment instead of the usual 
 
 52. I.R.C. § 1400N(j) (benefiting public utilities by stating that public utility property losses 
caused by Hurricane Katrina may, at taxpayer’s election, be carried back ten years instead of 
two years); § 1400(N)(o) (benefiting public utilities by allowing the deduction of GO Zone 
public utility property losses from Hurricane Katrina in the fifth tax year before the year of the 
loss); § 1400(N)(i)(1) (benefiting timber interests by increasing the § 179 deduction limit of 
reforestation costs from $10,000 to $20,000 for small timber producers whose property was 
destroyed by Hurricane Katrina and whose property was located in the GO Zone region);  
§ 1400(N)(i)(2) (benefiting timber interests by allowing net operating losses for small timber 
producers incurred prior to January 1, 2007, to be carried back for five years, rather than the 
two years previously allowed); § 1400N(g) (benefiting oil and gas producers by extending the 
deduction under § 198 for expenditures incurred to clean up qualified contaminated sites in the 
GO Zone through December 31, 2007, and defining petroleum products as hazardous 
substances); § 1400(O) (benefiting colleges and universities by doubling the Hope Credit to 
$3000 and also doubling the Lifetime Learning Credit percentage from 20 percent to 40 percent 
of the first $10,000 in qualified tuition and related expenses, for a maximum Lifetime Learning 
Credit of $4000 for students attending undergraduate or graduate institutions in the GO Zone). 
These provisions apply to tax years 2005 and 2006. The same income phase out provisions still 
apply. 
 53. Gulf Opportunity Zone Act (GOZA), Pub. L. No. 109-135, § 101(a), 119 Stat. 2577 
(codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(c) (West Supp. 2006)). 
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limit of $100,000.54 GOZA also allows expensing of certain cleanup 
and demolition costs within the favored zone.55 
GOZA also authorizes the issuance of “Gulf Opportunity Zone 
Bonds,” which allow states and political subdivisions within the “Gulf 
Opportunity Zone” to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance capital 
investments on generally favorable terms.56 For example, the 
background I.R.C. provisions allow state and local governments to 
issue “qualified mortgage bonds” as a means of subsidizing the 
construction of housing units, as long as some of the financed units 
are reserved for residents who meet certain income limits.57 GOZA 
does not eliminate these statistical tests, but rather relaxes them, 
making it easier for projects to qualify for favorable financing. 
Some of these provisions may be justified by the scope of the 
disaster to which they respond, but that is by no means self-evident in 
most cases. In at least some cases, if the provision is justified in 
helping victims rebuild their businesses in the hurricane zone, it 
would be equally well-justified in a small Midwestern town 
devastated by a tornado. For example, GOZA’s rules allowing more 
remote net operating loss carrybacks (from the normal two years to 
five) would seem about equally beneficial, and equally justified, for 
any business that was destroyed by a catastrophe.58 
f. GOZA’s Provisions and Special Interests.  GOZA’s 
provisions also demonstrate another problem of tax legislative 
responses to disasters: it contains many provisions that will benefit 
particular business interests that had invested or do invest within the 
designated areas. Lobbyists (and those who try to monitor them) 
sometimes refer to particular legislation as a “Christmas tree” bill—a 
piece of legislation that appears to have beneath its branches a nicely 
wrapped gift or two for every industry important enough to have a 
trade association. Because the concept is informal, nowhere defined, 
and inherently subjective, we do not assert that the disaster-relief bills 
 
 54. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(d) (West Supp. 2006)). Expensing under 
section 179 is an allowance typically used by small businesses in lieu of depreciation deductions. 
It is quite favorable to taxpayers, and its availability and scope are accordingly quite limited. 
 55. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(f) (West Supp. 2006)). 
 56. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 1400N(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006)). 
 57. I.R.C. § 143 (2000) (imposing the requirements necessary for favorable financing). 
 58. GOZA § 101(a) (codified in I.R.C. § 172, which provides the background rules on net 
operating loss carrybacks, and I.R.C. § 1400N(k), which extends the carrybacks for qualified 
losses). 
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can necessarily be characterized this way. And, although the term is 
certainly pejorative, bills with benefits distributed broadly among 
interest groups are not necessarily bad bills. Perhaps in this instance, 
one could say—if it does not push the metaphor too far—that after 
the catastrophes suffered in the fall, every industry with a stake in the 
Gulf coast region deserved to find a few delights under the tree at 
Christmas. Still, the profusion of industry-targeted benefits59 suggests 
that legislators intended more than just a careful pursuit of optimal 
public policy. It suggests instead that the urgency to do something—
almost anything—in response to a disaster that pulled at the nation’s 
sympathies created an atmosphere in which Congress could not say 
no. 
B. Legislative Response to the September 11 Attacks 
1. Chronology.  As was the case in the response to the 
hurricane season of 2005, the congressional approach to the terrorist 
attacks of four years earlier was performed in two Acts. The first, 
H.R. 2884, the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 
(VTTRA), was introduced on September 13, 2001—a mere two days 
after the attack on the World Trade Center.60 Bypassing normal 
procedures, House Ways and Means Committee Chair William 
Thomas and ranking Minority Member Charles Rangel sent the bill 
immediately to the floor, and the House passed the bill unanimously 
on September 13, 2001.61 Despite this nearly immediate response, 
however, the tax relief provisions did not win easy passage. Not until 
December 20, 2001 did both the House and Senate agree on the 
content of the Act.62 It ultimately garnered 129 cosponsors of which 
only 36 were Democrats.63 President Bush signed the bill into law on 
 
 59. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 60. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (VTTRA), H.R. 2884, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 61. Patti Mohr & Warren Rojas, House Passes Bipartisan Tax Relief for Terrorist Attack 
Victims, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 14, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 179-1. 
 62. Patti Mohr, Congress Sends Victims’ Tax Relief Bill to President Bush, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Dec. 21, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 246-1. 
 63. H.R. 2884, 107th Cong. (2001). It ultimately passed the House on a voice vote. Rep. 
William M. Thomas, House Passes Victims of Terrorism Relief Act, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 11, 
2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 8-37. The Democratic sponsors, however, included such liberal leaders 
as Richard Gephardt and Charles Rangel. 
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January 23, 2002, more than four months after the September 11 
attacks.64 
The delay was due in large part to the Senate’s desire to include 
a payroll tax exemption for victims out of a concern that the tax 
provisions would otherwise give little or no relief to poorer victims 
with little or no income tax liability.65 
Moreover, the House and Senate also postponed passage of tax 
incentives designed to help rebuild lower Manhattan.66 Those stimulus 
provisions became part of the second act relating to September 11 tax 
changes, H.R. 3090, the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act 
(JCWA). The president did not sign the act until March 9, 2002, 
nearly six months after the attack on the World Trade Center. We 
discuss the two acts in chronological order below. Like the hurricane 
provisions, these provisions raise questions about vertical equity, 
horizontal equity, and efficiency, particularly when the victims of 
September 11 are compared to soldiers who die in combat and the tax 
provisions addressing September 11 are compared to the provisions 
of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. 
2. VTTRA.  VTTRA extended income and estate tax benefits 
available to members of the armed forces killed in or as a result of 
combat67 to three groups: those who died in the September 11 attacks, 
those who died in the Oklahoma City bombing of April 1995, and 
those who died from anthrax attacks following the September 11 
attacks.68 We see in this an interesting pattern—one that can also be 
discerned in favorable treatment of victims of lesser hurricanes such 
 
 64. Press Release, The White House, President Bush Signs Legislation to Help Victims of 
Terrorism (Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/ 
20020123-20.html. 
 65. The ultimate compromise was not to give payroll tax relief, but to guarantee each 
victim at least $10,000 in income tax relief. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
No. 107-134, § 692(d)(2), 115 Stat. 2427 (2001). That is, lower-income victims who did not have 
income tax liability of $10,000 would receive payments from the government so that the total 
relief equaled $10,000. See Sen. Tom Daschle, Senate Concurs with House Amendments to 
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 11, 2002, LEXIS, 2002 TNT 8-36 
(“[I]nclud[ing] a provision that did not include payroll taxes but set a minimum of $10,000 so 
lower income people would receive some tax refund.”). 
 66. See Daschle, supra note 65 (quoting Sen. Schumer as refusing “to stand in the way” and 
thus willing to permit removing from the bill the part intended to benefit lower Manhattan). 
 67. See I.R.C. §§ 692 and 2201 (West Supp. 2006). 
 68. Mohr & Rojas, supra note 61; Rep. Charles Rangel, Rangel Bill to Aid Victims of 
Terrorist Attack, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 14, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 179-24. 
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as Rita and Wilma: when one disaster is so great that it seems to call 
for heavy congressional artillery, other, smaller but more or less 
similar disasters get caught up in the wave. This is an understandable 
response on the part of Congress: the Oklahoma City and anthrax 
tragedies were indeed similar enough to the September 11 attacks to 
justify similar treatment, just as Hurricanes Rita and Wilma were 
destructive storms similar to Katrina. Had they happened by 
themselves, however, they would not have been quite dramatic or 
intense enough to produce the response that the September 11 
attacks, or, later, Hurricane Katrina, did. (We can only imagine that 
in the case of the anthrax terrorism; but we know from history that 
there was no immediate relief available for families affected by the 
Oklahoma City bombing on a scale that followed the September 11 
attacks; similarly, each individual hurricane, even a fairly destructive 
one, does not produce its own tax bill.) 
Smaller-scale disasters, it would appear, call for dramatic 
legislative responses only if they occur within some temporal 
proximity to bigger ones, and involve losses that are similar in type, if 
not in magnitude. Disasters, however, fall along a continuum of 
severity, and the individual victims of smaller disasters, while less 
numerous, may be just as deserving (or undeserving) of any special 
tax relief as victims of the disasters whose magnitude moves Congress 
into action. A more even response to taxpayers who are victimized in 
particular ways would be desirable from a tax policy viewpoint. 
In the case of the September 11 attacks, the disaster type could 
be described as willful terrorist attacks on American soil, with 
American citizens as the targets. The September 11 attacks 
themselves, alone among the three episodes covered by VTTRA, 
were perpetrated by non-Americans, giving rise to a sense of attack 
that could be, and inevitably was, thought of as akin to warfare. In 
extolling the House bill, Representative Charles Rangel asserted on 
September 13 that the families of the terrorists’ victims should be 
given at least “all of the benefits we have offered to the families killed 
in war zones in the past.”69 Representative William Thomas urged, 
it is the least that we can do before we adjourn for this week to put 
on record that Members of the House of Representatives, in a 
bipartisan way, believe that those victims of those attacks on 
September 11 were in a combat zone and should be afforded the 
 
 69. Mohr & Rojas, supra note 61; accord Rangel, supra note 68. 
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privileges and protections that are in the code for military personnel 
and for civilian personnel because, clearly, this is the first, I believe, 
substantive reflection of the fact that we are at war.70 
The war metaphor, while moving and powerful, is nevertheless 
misleading. It has had mischievous results in the tax area, as well as 
many others. War is an armed conflict between or among nation-
states. Terrorism is not ordinarily within this definition. One may 
speak loosely of a war on crime, a war on poverty, or a war on avian 
flu; but that usage is metaphorical. In the tax area, the metaphor is 
unhelpful at best and may have encouraged Congress to ignore 
principles of sound tax policy. 
Promotion of these tax provisions as integral to a war may have 
assisted those who wish to make fundamental changes to our tax 
code. Under VTTRA, provisions designed to help lower-income 
military personnel, by supplementing military pay, were expanded in 
a way that produced large benefits for wealthy victims of disaster. At 
least one of these special provisions, relating to the estate tax, may 
have served as a pilot for controversial changes sought by some 
members, arguably a somewhat backdoor approach to tax reform. A 
closer examination of these provisions will make the sources of 
concern more evident. 
Section 692 of the I.R.C. has long provided that income tax shall 
not apply to the income of any soldier who dies in or as a result of 
combat zone injury or disease for the year of death and “any taxable 
year ending on or after the first day” the soldier served in the combat 
zone.71 VTTRA amended this provision to give a similar benefit to the 
three specified groups of terrorist victims for both the year of their 
death and the preceding year. 
VTTRA also gave the victims of terrorism the same estate tax 
relief as that extended to soldiers. In the course of consideration of 
 
 70. Rep. William M. Thomas, House Passes Tax Relief for Terrorist Attack Victims, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Sept. 20, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 183-32. Of course, this belief was significantly 
less apt in the case of the Oklahoma City bombing, but that seems not to have troubled 
Congress—at least not enough to make distinctions among the remedies they crafted in the Act 
on this basis. 
 71. Section 692 of the Internal Revenue Act of 1954 is the descendant of section 421 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as superseded by section 154 of the 1939 Code. See Rev. Rul. 
56-323, 1956-2 C.B. 993. Originally, it was a provision enacted to grant tax relief to soldiers who 
died “on or after December 7, 1941, while in active service as a member of the military or naval 
forces of the United States.” The provision was to continue in force until “the termination of 
[World War II] as proclaimed by the President.” Id. 
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estate tax relief, however, Congress changed the nature of relief 
granted for the estate tax, both for soldiers and the terrorist victims. 
Prior to VTTRA, section 2201 of the I.R.C. had replaced the federal 
estate tax that would otherwise have been imposed for active 
members of the armed forces killed in action in a combat zone with a 
federal estate tax equal to 125 percent of the maximum state death 
tax credit.72 Needing to reconcile the provision with the phase-out of 
the credit for state estate tax liability that Congress enacted as part of 
estate tax reform in June of 2001,73 VTTRA substituted a special 
estate tax rate structure for both such soldiers and for victims of 
terrorism. Under this special rate structure, the estate tax begins at a 
1 percent rate for taxable estates over $100,000 and reaches a 
maximum rate of 20 percent when the taxable estate exceeds $10.1 
million. (At the time, the general estate tax rates under section 2002 
began at 18 percent for amounts over $10,000 and went up to 50 
percent for estates over $2.5 million.74) 
Thus, VTTRA purported to treat the victims of September 11 in 
the same way as soldiers killed in combat for purposes of both the 
income and estate taxes. In fact, these income and estate tax 
provisions of VTTRA ignore key and relevant differences between 
soldiers and the victims of terrorism, particularly victims of the 
September 11 attack. 
3. Comparing the Victims of September 11 to Soldiers Killed in 
Combat.  The longstanding special tax provisions for members of the 
armed forces, including the special income and estate tax provisions 
for those killed in combat, are part of a package designed ex ante to 
attract and reward soldiers for a decision to serve voluntarily in the 
 
 72. I.R.C. § 2201 (2000) (before amendment by the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 
2001 (VTTRA), H.R. 2884, 107th Cong. (2001)); see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF VICTIMS OF TERRORISM RELIEF ACT 
OF 2001 (Comm. Print 2001) (“The Code also provides a reduction in Federal estate taxes for 
taxable estates of United States Citizens or residents who are killed in action while serving in a 
combat zone . . . .”). After the estate tax liability is calculated, credits, including the unified 
credit of I.R.C. § 2010 and the state death tax credit of § 2011, are then applied to reduce or 
eliminate the amount of estate tax payable. 
 73. Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 
(2001). 
 74. Estate tax liability is satisfied up to limits established by Code by a unified credit under 
I.R.C. § 2010. Although soldiers and victims of terrorism were given special tax rates under 
VTTRA, they remained entitled to the I.R.C. § 2010 credit as determined under the standard 
tax rates, I.R.C. § 2201(d), thus further reducing out-of-pocket tax liability. 
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armed forces. The Department of Defense “views the federal tax 
advantage as part of service members’ cash compensation when it 
compares military pay with civilian pay.”75 The military compensation 
package includes uniform benefits in the form of health plans, 
pension plans, death, and disability benefits.76 The Department of 
Defense “relies heavily on noncash benefits because it views benefits 
as critical to morale, retention, and the quality of life for service 
members and their families.”77 The Department of Defense 
recognizes that without such tax and benefit provisions, the United 
States government would need to compensate soldiers at a higher 
level. 
For soldiers, then, these tax benefit provisions reflect a decision 
by Congress to use federal funds through tax benefits rather than 
through purely monetary compensation. Although these tax 
expenditures represent a choice to spend federal funds in one way 
rather than another, the cost of paying additional salary would 
equally be a cost to the government. Such is not the case for victims 
of terrorism who were unwitting casualties of a kind of combat, but 
whose income and wealth came from sources other than the federal 
treasury and whose employee benefits varied enormously. 
Most significantly, these provisions ignore important economic 
differences between the two groups. Members of our armed forces do 
not constitute a highly paid segment of society. Indeed, our soldiers 
are often among the least affluent groups in our society. According to 
the Congressional Record, as of 2003 there were approximately 
192,000 military families that earned only between $10,000 and 
$25,000 per year.78 
 
 75. See Derek B. Stewart, GAO Studies Effect of Combat Zone Exclusion, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, May 14, 2004, LEXIS, 2004 TNT 94-27. 
 76. According to some press reports, part of the reason for the delay between House and 
Senate passage of the bill was the difficulty Senate staffers encountered in trying to provide 
civilian victims with the same tax treatment as military personnel when civilian benefit plans 
vary so widely. See Patti Mohr, Senate Still Ironing Out Details of Victims’ Tax Relief Bill, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 12, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 198-07. 
 77. See Stewart, supra note 75. 
 78. 149 CONG. REC. S7449 (daily ed. June 05, 2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus). As a result 
of these low levels of salary, income exclusions can sometimes produce bizarre results. For 
example, section 112 of the Code excludes combat pay from income; however, the GAO in 2003 
found that the surprising result of the exclusion was that between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers lost 
some or all of two benefits designed to help poorer Americans: the earned income tax credit 
and the child tax credit. The exclusion of combat income lowered the amount of earned income 
below the amount necessary to make the military taxpayers in question eligible for the earned 
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Military cash compensation does not generally exhibit wide 
disparities, compared to those that might be expected in a similarly 
hierarchical civilian setting. The 2004 GAO memorandum explains 
that “a junior enlisted member with 3 years of service might earn 
around $40,000 in cash compensation, while a senior officer with 22 
years of service could earn cash compensation of about $130,000.”79 
An enlisted member at grade 9 with 12 years of service would have 
basic pay of $43,740 for fiscal year 2003.80 Thus, soldiers, of whatever 
rank or seniority, are seldom highly paid. And those who die in 
combat are more often young, with low seniority and rank and thus 
with low pay.81 
In contrast, the victims of terrorism under VTTRA span the full 
range of income and wealth possibilities. Indeed, a disproportionate 
number of them were people of higher income and wealth. According 
to the U.S. Census Bureau, the bottom income quintile of the U.S. 
population for 2000 had household income of no more than $17,920; 
the top quintile of income for 2000 began at household income above 
$81,766; and the top 5 percent of incomes started at $145,220.82 The 
Final Report of The Special Master for the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001 reports that only a little more than 6 
percent of the deceased victims who filed claims had individual 
income under $25,000.83 Almost 40 percent of the September 11th 
 
income tax credit. This was not a completely consistent result; other, higher-income soldiers 
became eligible for the earned income tax credit because the exclusion lowered their incomes to 
a point that they no longer exceeded the ceiling for the credit. See Stewart, supra note 75. 
Exclusion of combat pay had similar mixed, and sometimes bizarre, effects on the child tax 
credit. Id. 
 79. See Stewart, supra note 75. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The youngest and lowest-ranking members of the military have accounted for a 
majority of the casualties during Operation Iraqi Freedom. As of September 2006, service 
members from pay grades E-1 to E-4 (the lowest-ranking pay grades) represented 50.7 percent 
of those killed in the Army, 76.7 percent of those killed in the Marines, and 46.6 percent of 
those killed in the Navy. Operation Iraqi Freedom Military Deaths: March 19, 2003, through 
September 30, 2006, available at http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm. 
By age, across the branches of the military, 53.2 percent of those killed were less than 25 years 
old, and 77.8 percent were 30 or younger. Id. 
 82. See U.S. Census Bureau, Historic Income Tables—Households, http://www.census.gov/ 
hhes/income/histinc/h01.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
 83. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE 
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 52, 97 (2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The Census Bureau and the 
Final Report define income quite differently. The Special Master of the September 11th Fund 
included capital gains, employer-provided benefits, pensions, health insurance, etc. Id. at 30–33. 
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victims had income of $100,000 or more.84 Some of the victims were in 
fact extraordinarily well compensated, with 25 having had incomes of 
$2,000,000 or more. Thus, applying provisions designed for soldiers to 
the victims of September 11 gives to the wealthy benefits intended for 
the middle class members of our society who have put themselves in 
harm’s way. 
VTTRA could have looked to an important distinction among 
the September 11 victims to make the Act a more reasonable 
response to the problem that gave rise to it. Congress could have 
distinguished two broad groups of victims: those who were merely in 
the wrong place at the wrong time; and those police and fire 
department officers whose volitional and selfless exposure to great 
risk was indeed heroic, and deserving of approbation and reward. If 
Congress had confined the military analogy, and the accompanying 
special relief, to those police and fire department personnel who 
entered the buildings in rescue efforts, it would have strayed less from 
the original intent and purpose of the relief. Although federal tax 
favors were not an explicit part of the compensation packages of the 
largely local officers involved, the relief would at least have been 
targeted at middle-income families of ordinary wealth. It would also 
have been sensible in such a case to think of the relief as an 
appropriate reward for public service of heroic proportions. Finally, it 
would have been much less costly in terms of foregone revenue, 
because the individuals and their families would likely have been in 
lower tax brackets than many of those inside the buildings, and would 
have little if any of their wealth transmission at death exposed to the 
estate tax, due to the much lower average sizes of their estates. 
4. Comparison of VTTRA and the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund.  The September 11 victims were injured and 
died for being Americans. The congressional desire to express 
 
The Bureau of Census data, in contrast, defines income as “[m]oney income excluding capital 
gains before taxes.” U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey (CPS)—Definitions and 
Explanations, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last visited Sept. 25, 
2006). Thus, if we were comparing individuals to individuals, the income levels reported by the 
Special Master would be higher than those for comparable individuals in the Census data. The 
Census Bureau, however, reports household income and the Special Master did not. If 
household incomes of September 11 victims were considered, the disparity between the income 
level of the general population and that of the September 11 victims would probably be even 
greater. 
 84. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 97. 
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sympathy for these victims by compensating them in some way is one 
America as a nation shared. The nation, however, expressed this 
sympathy and offered compensation apart from and prior to VTTRA. 
It did so with the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,85 which 
was enacted, in the words of the Special Master chosen to administer 
it, as “a unique response to an unprecedented historical event” out of 
a “national sense of grief and compassion.”86 
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,87 
which established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 
was signed into law by the president on September 22, 2001, and 
required that regulations be promulgated within ninety days.88 Thus, 
by the time Congress passed VTTRA the following December, it was 
well aware that the victims of September 11 would be entitled to 
large, individualized awards funded by the Treasury, awards that 
themselves would be free of income tax liability.89 The average award 
under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund for families of 
victims killed in the attacks “exceeded $2 million,” and the total 
amount awarded was more than $7 billion.”90 
Awards under the Victim Compensation Fund varied with the 
victim’s economic situation so that the award from the fund increased 
as the victim’s income increased. In the Final Report, the Special 
Master queried the statutory approach mandating individualized 
awards: “The fireman’s widow would complain: ‘Why am I receiving 
less money than the stockbroker’s widow? My husband died a hero. 
 
 85. “[U]ltimately, 97% of eligible families who lost a loved one on September 11 
voluntarily participated in the Program . . . .” Id. at 80. For discussion of the policy issues 
involved in the structure of the Victim Compensation Fund, see generally Stephen Landsman, 
Symposium: After Disaster: The September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil 
Justice, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 205 (2003). 
 86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 83. 
 87. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (2001). 
 88. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 3–4. 
 89. Although the awards from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund would 
surely have been amounts of damages received on account of physical injury, and thus 
deductible under I.R.C. § 104, a separate provision relating to disaster relief payments was 
added to the Code by VTTRA. VTTRA, H.R. 2884, 107th Cong., § 111 (2001) (codified in 
I.R.C. § 139 (West Supp. 2006)). This provision specifies that gross income shall not include 
“any amount received as payment under § 406 of the Air Transportation Safety and System 
Stabilization Act,” which established the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. Id. Thus, 
VTTRA also excludes from income amounts received by victims’ families from that fund. See 
Rev. Rul. 2003-115, 2003-2 C.B. 1052. 
 90. FINAL REPORT, supra note 83, at 1. 
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Why are you demeaning the value of his life.’”91 Even within a system 
of individualized awards, however, the Victim Compensation Fund 
had special rules for calculating the economic loss of for those with 
income levels above the 98th percentile. “For victims whose income 
exceeded the 98th percentile, the Fund calculated a ‘presumed’ 
economic loss using $231,000 as the income level (i.e., the 98th 
percentile income level in the year 2000).”92 
Unlike the Victim Compensation Fund, there is no cap, 
presumed or otherwise, to the income tax exclusion of VTTRA. In 
failing to enact a cap, Congress departed from the limited precedent 
regarding income tax relief for victims of terrorism. Congress 
provided income tax relief to victims of the terrorist bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988, but with a very 
different result. In contrast with the unlimited income tax forgiveness 
under VTTRA, tax relief for victims of Pan Am Flight 103 was 
“limited to an amount equal to 28 percent of the annual rate of basic 
pay at Level V of the U.S. Executive Schedule as of December 21, 
1988,” which provided tax relief equal “to that which was provided to 
personnel of the United States who were on Flight 103, thus providing 
equal relief to all of the victims. . . .”93 VTTRA may have responded 
to a public need to express further sympathy for the victims of 
terrorism, but it did so in a way that favored the wealthy in ways 
unnecessary, and arguably counter, to the nature of the nation’s grief. 
5. The Incentives in JCWA.  The incentive provisions for New 
York in JCWA also favor the wealthier, those with capital to invest. 
This Act included provisions of the type often proposed for purposes 
of economic stimulus. They comprised six provisions: $15 billion of 
tax-exempt bonds for property in the “Liberty Zone” of lower 
Manhattan; a 30 percent bonus depreciation for certain property in 
the zone; a reduced recovery period from fifteen years to five years 
for leasehold improvements made to commercial property in the 
zone; increased small business expensing for qualifying property used 
in the Liberty Zone; extending from two years to five years the period 
 
 91. Id. at 82. 
 92. Id. at 8. Families of high-income earners had the option of seeking a hearing to request 
a departure from this computation. Id. at 37. 
 93. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND 
THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 3 (Comm. Print 2001). 
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within which a taxpayer can replace destroyed property with similar 
property, without recognizing any gain on the destroyed property; 
and a new work opportunity credit for certain employees in New 
York City.94 
Our criticism of these provisions is that it would be difficult to 
find five square miles on earth less in need of enhanced development 
incentives than the southern tip of Manhattan, which has a credible 
claim to being the business and financial capital of the planet. Tax 
incentives of this sort tend to be relatively easily captured in the price 
of the real estate; but an artificial boost of the price of this real estate 
serves no clear public purpose. The case for conferring such a windfall 
on the owners of real estate in lower Manhattan is not obvious, and 
was certainly not made in the legislative history of the JCWA.95 
6. Evaluation of September 11 Tax Relief.  The September 11 
relief raises questions of both vertical and horizontal equity. As noted 
above, under VTTRA, the families of these victims of September 11 
also receive awards from the Victim Compensation Fund free of 
income tax.96 Such treatment parallels the exclusion under I.R.C. 
section 104 for compensation for physical injury, and can presumably 
be justified by arguments similar to those justifying the latter section. 
A troubling defect in the structure of section 104, however, is that 
while injury victims are allowed to exclude any recoveries they are 
able to achieve (on grounds that the recoveries simply offset earlier, 
undeducted losses97), victims who achieve no compensation (because, 
for example, there was no tortfeasor, or the tortfeasor cannot be 
found), receive no deduction for the losses associated with the 
injury.98 The VTTRA provision relieves one inequity at the expense 
 
 94. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., SUMMARY OF P.L. 107-147, 
THE “JOB CREATION AND WORKER ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2002” (Comm. Print 2002). 
 95. Similar provisions were enacted in GOZA: tax-exempt bond financing, I.R.C.  
§ 1400N(a), additional first-year depreciation, § 1400N(d), increased expensing for qualified 
property, § 1400N(e), and a five-year rather than a two-year limit for replacement of property,  
§ 1400N(k). They were not highlighted in the earlier section, in part because they seem arguably 
more defensible in the context of the widespread physical destruction in southern Louisiana and 
Mississippi. 
 96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 97. The prefatory language in I.R.C. § 104(a) makes clear that to the extent that a 
deduction was taken under the medical expense deduction provisions of I.R.C. § 213, no 
exclusion is allowable under I.R.C. § 104. 
 98. Of course, the losses that consist of medical expenses may be wholly or partly 
deductible under I.R.C. § 213, depending on the circumstances of the taxpayer. 
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of perpetrating another, by allowing the equivalent of such a 
deduction (through the exclusion of the award), but only for victims 
of the terrorist attacks. 
One is left wondering why any victim of a tort or crime who 
cannot achieve a recovery through the justice system should not also 
be entitled to either excludible compensation, or, at the very least, a 
deduction for his uncompensated losses. As with many of the 
KETRA provisions, one searches in vain for an explanation of why 
some victims should be entitled to more favorable tax treatment than 
others. It would not be difficult to adopt a compensation scheme that 
would apply with greater generality, and it is difficult to find good 
policy justifications for limiting it to categories of victims that are set 
by Congress capriciously: If a taxpayer was a victim of the September 
11 attacks, favorable tax treatment follows. If the taxpayer was 
instead the victim of an ordinary homicide, then no special relief is 
available. If a taxpayer’s home was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, 
favorable tax treatment follows. If it was destroyed instead by an 
ordinary, nameless tornado, then no special relief is available. But 
these categories make little or no sense to taxpayers that have lost 
their breadwinners or their homes. 
The provisions noted earlier excluding regular income, and 
extending favorable estate tax treatment, go well beyond even the 
thin justifications of section 104, and seem especially jarring in the 
case of those victims who left behind very large estates. We assert that 
their families are no more deserving of special tax benefits than the 
family of any other victim of murder. Any family that loses a 
breadwinner to shocking acts of violence suffers immense damage, 
which no recompense can hope to repair. But all are in roughly the 
same situation. Special treatment of the September 11 victims can 
only be explained by sympathy, but sympathy of a sentimental and 
arbitrary form. It does not reflect sound policy analysis. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
Up to this point, the arguments in this Article have been framed 
largely in terms of what Congress should voluntarily eschew when it 
amends the tax laws in response to natural or man-made disasters. It 
may be useful to ask, if only for the novelty of doing so, whether the 
Constitution allows all of the things that Congress has done to the tax 
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laws in recent years in response to disasters.99 This is not ordinarily a 
very productive inquiry in the case of federal tax questions, because 
the Supreme Court (and the lower federal courts, following its lead) 
has rarely managed to find constitutional shortcomings in the federal 
income tax laws as enacted by Congress. Even the most notable 
exception, Eisner v. Macomber,100 is now generally thought to be 
something of a relic, with little continuing validity as a constitutional 
precedent.101 
There is, however, a constitutional provision that should give 
Congress pause as it enacts tax legislation that applies depending on 
where a particular taxpayer lives, or where particular property is 
located. The Uniformity Clause of Section 8 of Article I, which, after 
conferring on Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises” adds: “but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall 
be uniform throughout the United States,”102 might well have been 
included in the Constitution precisely to prevent legislation of the sort 
discussed in this Article. Tax rules that allow, for example, taxpayers 
who live in Louisiana to withdraw retirement account funds 
prematurely but without penalty to repair wind damage to their 
houses, but do not allow taxpayers who live in North Dakota to do 
the same, would seem vulnerable to judicial invalidation under this 
provision. 
In its strongest form, it would seem that this clause would simply 
bar any tax enactments that depend on geographical qualifications. 
Even in its weakest form, this provision would obligate Congress to 
act only pursuant to a reasonable basis for using geographic 
 
 99. We are indebted to Larry Zelenak for suggesting that we explicitly consider this 
argument, which we had initially neglected, and for his helpful article, Are Rifle Shot Transition 
Rules and Other Ad Hoc Tax Legislation Constitutional?, 44 TAX L. REV. 563 (1989). 
 100. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
 101. This seems to be so even within the Court itself. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n. v. 
Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), in which Justice Marshall describes the realization requirement—
imposed by the Macomber Court as a matter of constitutional imperative in 1920—as being 
founded upon “administrative convenience.” Id. at 559. 
 102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This clause begins by granting Congress the power to 
“collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises,” and concludes by imposing the Uniformity Clause 
quoted in the text on only the last three of these. This construction might be read to exclude 
“Taxes,” possibly including the federal income tax, from the constraints of the Uniformity 
Clause. In an early case following the imposition of our first modern income tax, however, the 
Supreme Court rejected this view: “[T]he contention that the [16th] Amendment treats a tax on 
income as a direct tax . . . and . . . therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity . . . is . . . wholly 
without foundation . . . .” Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 18 (1916). 
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distinctions. Interpreted in this latter, weaker form, it would mandate 
precisely the process suggested to Congress by this Article: that it 
only make distinctions on geographic grounds when there is a clear 
and salient distinction between taxpayers within and without the 
boundaries of the geographic distinctions in question. 
Thus, if a tax act grants a greater duration for replacement of 
damaged property to taxpayers living in areas where the 
infrastructure necessary to undertake replacements has suffered 
widespread damage, it would (or might) survive scrutiny under the 
uniformity provision.103 In contrast, where no meaningful distinction 
in circumstances between taxpayers within and without the borders of 
a geographically-defined entitlement can be cited, the tax act would 
be subject to invalidation. Perhaps, if Congress cannot be persuaded 
to undertake this sort of evaluation on its own, this test can be 
imposed upon Congress by the courts, acting under the authority of 
the Uniformity Clause. 
This argument seems far from frivolous; the limited case law on 
the Uniformity Clause, however, offers little encouragement to those 
who would advance it. The cases are few, presumably reflecting the 
fact that Congress ordinarily refrains from enacting tax rules of 
geographically limited scope. An influential nineteenth-century 
Supreme Court decision involving this question, denoted as the Head 
Money Cases,104 related to a modest head tax imposed on owners of 
steam and sailing vessels for every passenger disembarking at a U.S. 
port who was not a U.S. citizen.105 Cunard Lines (among others) 
refused to pay, on the ground (among others) that the tax did not 
apply uniformly because aliens entering by train or coach at inland 
points of entry were not subject to the tax. 
The Court ultimately upheld the statute without conclusively 
addressing the Uniformity Clause constraints, finding that “the power 
exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. [It is] . . . the mere 
incident of the regulation of commerce.”106 Along the way to that 
 
 103. See infra Part IV (discussing sensible geographic distinctions). 
 104. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). This decision was relied upon by the Supreme 
Court in two later cases: Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 160–61 (1974) 
(interpreting the parallel constitutional provision of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 regarding 
uniformity in bankruptcy law); and United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 82 (1983) (involving 
the tax Uniformity Clause itself, and discussed extensively below). 
 105. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 23 Stat. 214 (repealed 1966) (imposing a tax of fifty cents 
per person). 
 106. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595. 
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conclusion, however, the Court also noted that a “tax is uniform when 
it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the 
subject of it is found.”107 This suggests that the Court believed that if a 
tax that could be, and was, expressed in neutral terms, it would not 
fail on the ground that the tax had a disparate impact among 
taxpayers living in different states. An otherwise uniform tax on oil 
extraction, for example, would not fail simply because taxpayers in 
Texas extract a lot of oil, while taxpayers in Maine extract none. 
Taxes on oil extraction were in fact the subject matter of the one 
Supreme Court decision most closely resembling the issues presented 
by post-disaster tax legislation.108 Following a period of price controls 
in the late 1970s, Congress and the White House were about to 
deregulate the price of crude oil as a means of encouraging 
exploration for and development of new oil sources. There was 
concern, however, (which now seems rather quaint) about allowing 
producers of oil that would have come to the market in any event to 
receive the full benefit of the newly uncapped prices. The carefully 
engineered result of balancing these competing considerations was 
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980.109 
One of several categories of oil favorably treated under the 
provisions of this act was “exempt Alaskan oil,” which was defined in 
section 4994(e) as: 
any crude oil (other than Sadlerochit oil) which is produced— 
(1) from a reservoir from which oil has been produced in 
commercial quantities through a well located north of the 
Arctic Circle, or 
(2) from a well located on the northerly side of the divide of the 
Alaskan-Aleutian Range and at least 75 miles from the nearest 
point on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.110 
Some producers that paid the windfall profit tax sued for refunds 
of taxes paid, and were successful in having the act declared 
 
 107. Id. at 594. 
 108. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983). 
 109. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 
(temporarily adding I.R.C. §§ 4986–4990). 
 110. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 77 (quoting § 4994(e)). 
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unconstitutional in the Wyoming Federal District Court.111 Direct 
appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed, setting the stage for the 
first Supreme Court consideration of the limitations imposed by the 
Uniformity Clause. 
The Supreme Court in this case, United States v. Ptasynski,112 
accepted the dicta quoted above from Head Money Cases as 
something of a point of departure.113 But the rule under evaluation in 
Ptasynski was not one that had been stated in a geographically-
neutral manner (as it had been in the Head Money Cases), but rather 
one that was quite specific about the extraction locations that would 
be favorably treated. The Court, however, explained that the Head 
Money Cases rule was essentially a one-way inference: while 
geographically-neutral language generally would insulate a tax 
provision from invalidation under the Uniformity Clause, 
geographically-specific language would not lead to automatic 
invalidity. Rather, the Court said, “where Congress does choose to 
frame a tax in geographic terms, we will examine the classification 
closely to see if there is actual geographic discrimination.”114 
But not too closely, it would appear. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Powell also noted that: “The Uniformity Clause gives 
Congress wide latitude in deciding what to tax and does not prohibit 
it from considering geographically isolated problems.”115 The Court 
had already by this point in the opinion noted that the statutorily-
defined term “exempt Alaskan oil” was by no means perfectly 
congruent with “oil produced in Alaska.”116 Indeed, the Court noted 
that less than 20 percent of then-current Alaskan oil production 
would be exempt from the tax under the § 4994(e) definition,117 and 
that certain offshore production, beyond the territorial limits of the 
state, would qualify for the exemption under that definition, despite 
 
 111. Ptasynski v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 549 (D. Wyo. 1982) (invalidating the Crude Oil 
Windfall Profit Tax Act in its entirety because the provisions exempting certain kinds of oil 
from the tax on impermissible grounds could not be severed from the other provisions of the 
Act). 
 112. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 74. 
 113. Id. at 82. 
 114. Id. at 85. 
 115. Id. at 84. 
 116. Id. at 77–78. 
 117. Id. at 77. 
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the fact that the oil in that situation could not be said to have come 
from Alaska.118 
Perhaps of greater significance was the Court’s view that 
Congress had made the findings necessary to justify the geographic 
distinctions embodied in the Act: 
Congress clearly viewed “exempt Alaskan oil” as a unique class of 
oil that, consistent with the scheme of the Act, merited favorable 
treatment.119 It had before it ample evidence of the disproportionate 
costs and difficulties—the fragile ecology, the harsh environment, 
and the remote location—associated with extracting oil from this 
region.120 
And that, it appears, was sufficient. Although this examination of 
the classification seems more cursory than “close,” it was nevertheless 
satisfactory to every member of the Court in this unanimous decision. 
Although this certainly is not encouraging for taxpayers who 
might wish to challenge, on the basis of the Uniformity Clause, the 
narrowness of the disaster legislation’s relief, it may not be hopeless. 
The Supreme Court’s summary of the analysis behind the design of 
the Windfall Profits bill may have been excessively brief, but there 
was indeed a good deal of thought given to the categories created by 
that bill. The essential goal of that bill was to burden the production 
of oil that would have been brought to market even without price 
decontrol, without diminishing the incentives to bring to the market 
oil that could not have been feasibly produced under the then-existing 
price constraints. The discrimination among categories of oil in that 
tax bill, in other words, really was the centerpiece of that legislation, 
without which it could not have achieved its purposes. 
That is much less self-evident in the case of many of the 
provisions of KETRA, GOZA, and VTTRA. Congress did not 
consider—or at least did not adequately explain—why it thought it 
necessary to allow better treatment for taxpayers in the defined 
 
 118. Id. at 78. The significance to the Court of these facts is not completely clear, because it 
was nevertheless the case that the geographic range of the favored category of oil was still quite 
limited. But the fact that the favorable provision was not confined to a single state, and was far 
from comprehensive within the state most favored, seemed to suggest that the category was not 
designed by means of political horse trading of the sort that the Court thought the Uniformity 
Clause was meant to prohibit. 
 119. The Court cited STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH CONG., THE DESIGN 
OF A WINDFALL PROFIT TAX 20–23 (Comm. Print, 1979) in support of this proposition. 
 120. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. at 85 (internal citation added). 
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geographical zones than the background provisions of the I.R.C. 
permit to taxpayers who experience similar losses outside of the 
favored geographical zones. It would therefore seem that a 
constitutional objection based on the Uniformity Clause might still 
reasonably be raised. 
There may be substantial practical difficulties in this approach, 
however, in addition to the uphill battle involved in distinguishing a 
recent, unanimous and contrary Supreme Court precedent: A 
challenge will necessarily require a taxpayer from a disfavored 
geographical area to bring the attack. But, generally, taxpayers lack 
standing to attack favorable treatment that Congress may have 
accorded to other taxpayers.121 Thus, acts like GOZA, which favor 
taxpayers in certain geographic areas but do not by their own terms 
specifically disfavor taxpayers elsewhere, are effectively immunized 
from judicial scrutiny by well-established standing principles: those 
who are favored by a particular provision have nothing to complain 
about, while those who are not favored are treated as complaining 
about favoritism shown to other taxpayers whose returns the 
complainant has no right to dispute. A child’s complaint that her 
brother got one more cookie than she may have been allowed some 
salience in the court of their mother’s kitchen, but similar claims 
relating to tax favoritism that Congress or the IRS bestows on other 
taxpayers have fared poorly in the federal courts. 
Instead of attacking the GOZA rule directly, a taxpayer seeking 
to advance a Uniformity Clause complaint could argue instead that it 
is the background rules that have been made invalid by the disaster 
act provisions that extend more favorable treatment to certain 
taxpayers. But the need to seek that more aggressive remedy puts one 
more obstacle in the path of taxpayers seeking relief on a Uniformity 
Clause ground. One may reluctantly conclude that this avenue is not 
particularly promising, even if in a better, more constitutionally 
constrained tax world, it would be. 
 
 121. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) 
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (2003). 
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III.  COMMON PROBLEMS IN ENACTING POST-DISASTER 
TAX LEGISLATION 
A. The Role of Sympathy in Tax 
Constitutional issues are not the only ones that complicate the 
tax response to disasters. The September 11 attacks and the 
Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita unleashed the sympathy of the 
American public. For the most part, however, the tax code does not 
know what to make of widespread sympathy. A core background 
assumption of the code is that taxpayers will act rationally in their 
self-interest. The tax law counts on this self-interest to protect the 
integrity of the tax system when, for example, it assumes that 
property changes hands at fair market value, as long as the sale is 
between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of 
relevant facts.122 
The tax code, of course, does not assume self-interest prevails in 
all situations; in particular, the presumption of a certain amount of 
intrafamily altruism is more the rule than the exception. The 
government taxes husband and wife as a couple.123 It gives exemptions 
for dependents124 and credits for children.125 It has established as well a 
number of antiavoidance provisions to prevent those for whom the 
assumption of self-interest does not hold from taking advantage of 
provisions that assume that parties to a transaction have opposing 
interests.126 
Other provisions make allowance for taxpayers who act in more 
broadly disinterested ways. The tax code allows, for example, 
charitable contribution deductions under section 170 for giving to the 
poor and needy, at least partly on grounds of efficiency—that 
 
 122. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (2005). 
 123. I.R.C. § 1(a) (2000). 
 124. I.R.C. § 151(c) (2000). 
 125. I.R.C. § 24 (2000). 
 126. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 267(a)(1) (2000) (disallowing loss recognition on sales between 
related parties). See generally Theodore P. Seto, The Assumption of Selfishness in the Internal 
Revenue Code: Reflections on the Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage 4–5 (Loyola Law 
School Legal Studies Paper No. 2005-33), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=850645 (“Where 
[the] assumption of selfishness proves or is likely to prove incorrect, the code makes 
adjustments . . . [that] shut down avoidance techniques or otherwise enforce the policies of the 
Code.”). 
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“charitable organizations receive more in donations than the 
Treasury loses in revenue due to a tax policy change”127 or “that the 
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from 
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by 
appropriations from public funds.”128 Alternatively, it allows the 
deduction as a matter of income definition: the consumption 
opportunities represented by the gift may be viewed as having been 
transferred to others; if those others are appropriate objects of 
charitable beneficence, it is likely that their own incomes would make 
the consumption opportunities effectively nontaxable because of 
personal exemptions, standard deductions, and the like.129 
Whatever rationale is offered, the motive for provisions such as 
these may be the powerful pull of sympathy, a kind of golden rule for 
the tax code, that we should treat others in dire straits as we would 
wish to be treated if we found ourselves in the same situation. 
Consider our treatment of life insurance. Under section 101, the 
proceeds of life insurance are excluded from beneficiaries’ income, 
even though in the case of whole-life or endowment insurance 
policies, much of the amount received represents a return on the 
insured’s investment. Marvin Chirelstein, in questioning the policy 
rationale for this exclusion, has observed that “there is a heavy flavor 
of condolence about the whole affair.”130 
A flavor of sympathy and condolence surrounds the reaction to 
these recent disasters as well. The terrorist acts, for example, gave 
“rise to the largest wave of charitable giving in modern U.S. 
history.”131 Americans, wherever they lived, whatever their economic 
status, identified with the victims of these disasters, who themselves 
came from all income levels. Even the very rich were vulnerable. All 
of us, rather than being simply witnesses, became interested persons, 
and Congress responded with a startling number and variety of tax 
 
 127. Don Fullerton & Shira D. Goodman, The Economic Recovery Act of 1981: Implications 
for Charitable Giving, 16 TAX NOTES 1027, 1028 (1982). 
 128. J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 
1938–1861, at 17 (1938). 
 129. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309, 344–58 (1972). 
 130. MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 42 (10th ed. 2005). 
 131. Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources 
Under the September 11th Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 591, 594 (2003). Similarly, 
private charities raised $3.27 billion to help the 2005 Hurricane victims. Jacqueline L. Salmon & 
Leef Smith, Two-Thirds of Katrina Donations Exhausted, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2006, at A1. 
02__APRILL_SCHMALBECK.DOC 11/14/2006  8:30 AM 
2006] POST-DISASTER TAX LEGISLATION 87 
benefits, including benefits to the wealthy. But such sympathy fits 
uncomfortably within the tax code. “When we sympathize with the 
other, we open our hearts to his or her subjective predicament, rather 
than our minds to his or her behavioral choices and preferences.”132 
Such sympathy distorts tax policy, by, for example, favoring the 
temporarily afflicted wealthy over the permanently poor. Sympathy, 
although a perfectly respectable sentiment, is probably not best 
expressed through financial benefits. Even when it is best so 
expressed, it probably should be done in the sort of direct ways that 
can more accurately target the benefits in the manner desired, rather 
than through the indirect means of tax favors, which can be more 
difficult to target accurately. 
In the case of September 11 and the Gulf-region hurricanes, 
sympathy begat sympathy in a cycle of increasing tax benefits. 
Initially, in VTTRA, Congress treated the September 11 attacks as 
unique, involving heroes who made a sacrifice for their country—like 
our men and women in uniform, rather than as the victims of a 
manmade disaster.133 The economic incentives enacted as part of 
JCWA, however, became only an opening bid in KETRA and was 
met and raised in GOZA. 
In these two cases, moreover, sympathy had geographic limits. 
The American public did not generalize their concern to all victims of 
all crimes or disasters, large or small. When the Red Cross 
determined that the needs of the September 11 victims had been met 
and wished to put contributions to other purposes, it faced an 
enormous public outcry, investigations by governmental officials, and 
a forced retreat.134 Americans identified with these particular victims, 
not victims generally.135 
 
 132. Robin West, Disciplines, Subjectivity, and Law, in THE FATE OF LAW 119, 153 (Austin 
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991). See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS (Augustus M. Kelley Publ’rs 1965) (1759) (exploring the long history of the role of 
sympathy in the law). 
 133. See supra Part I.B.3 (noting that heroic designations do not seem out of place as 
applied to the police and fire personnel who willingly exposed themselves to mortal risk in the 
September 11 rescue efforts). 
 134. Corey Kilgannon, Red Cross Offers to Refund Gifts for Sept. 11, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 
2001, at B10. 
 135. As a recent paper notes, we give “disproportionate sympathy and attention to 
identifiable as compared with statistical victims,” with the result that “debate about government 
spending and taxation is driven by vivid exemplars—iconic victims and perpetrators—rather 
than any rational calculation of costs and benefits.” George Loewenstein et al., Statistical, 
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Targeting tax benefits to impacted geographical areas is not new. 
But it is only rational if sympathy does not cloud judgment about 
whether the needs within a particular geographical area justify special 
treatment. Testifying before the Senate Finance Committee when it 
was considering Katrina relief,136 George Yin, then Chief of Staff for 
the Joint Committee on Taxation, expressed skepticism about such 
geographically targeted benefits. Present law, he explained, 
provides a model for location specific tax benefits, namely the 
provisions known as “enterprise zones,” which offer certain 
investment and employment incentives for geographically targeted 
areas that are chronically economically depressed. . . . In general, 
academic research has been inconclusive as to whether enterprise 
zones have significantly encouraged employment or investment.137 
Jane Gravelle, a Senior Specialist in Economic Policy at the 
Congressional Research Service, expressed stronger concerns during 
consideration of the hurricane legislation.138 Even accepting the 
standard arguments for enterprise zones, she doubted that such 
arguments could be applied “to rebuilding areas that are not (at least 
in their entirety) chronically depressed, but have been destroyed by a 
natural disaster.”139 
Congress did not heed these warnings. The combined pressure of 
public sentiment and ability to benefit the wealthy as part of package 
to relieve the effects of a disaster apparently proved irresistible. 
B. The Role of Wealth and Capital in Disaster Response 
These disasters produced a perfect legislative storm. Not only did 
they provoke a public demand for congressional action, they 
permitted those who do not endorse strongly notions of vertical 
equity to enact provisions to their liking. Since President Bush’s 
 
Identifiable and Iconic Victims and Perpetrators, 3–5 (Stanford Law Sch. Olin Program in Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 301, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678281. 
 136. George K. Yin, JCT Chief Testifies on Tax Provisions for Disaster Relief, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Sept. 30, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 189-45. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Jane G. Gravelle, CRS Discusses Post-Hurricane Rebuilding Incentives, TAX NOTES 
TODAY, Dec. 15, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 240-41 (suggesting that “the principal justification for 
intervention may be largely distributional—the desire to help people who have faced a 
significant loss to reclaim their lives”); see also Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1362 (1993) (“If enterprise zones merely provide income tax incentives, they will 
do little to produce new business and new jobs.”). 
 139. Gravelle, supra note 138. 
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election, the tax policies of his administration and the Republican 
Congress have frequently been criticized for favoring the rich over 
the poor. In fact, the disaster relief provisions do the same. Because 
they are packaged as disaster relief and thus seen as a response to 
tragedies that hurt both rich and poor, they escaped the criticisms that 
have been directed at other tax legislation, such as tax rate cuts on 
capital gains and dividends.140 
We have discussed earlier how little good tax benefits do for 
those with little or no tax liability.141 Similarly, the geographical 
investment incentives introduced in JCWA, KETRA, and GOZA 
have not been effective in restoring blighted areas, but have been 
effective in helping those who have capital to invest. The estate tax 
relief provided to the victims of terrorism follows the same pattern. 
To extend estate tax relief to these victims distorts the progressivity of 
the tax code. As Michael Graetz has written, a primary justification 
for the estate tax is “its role in the distribution of the tax burden, in 
particular, its role in providing an important element of progressivity 
in the federal tax system.”142 
The desire of the Bush administration and the Republican party 
to eliminate the estate tax, which increases progressivity by taxing the 
wealthy, is reflected in the legislative history of VTTRA. Senator 
George Allen, Republican of Virginia, proposed exempting victims 
from “all Federal death taxes on the estates of any individual killed 
during, or as a result of injuries derived from, the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.”143 The explanation he offered was that the family of 
the victims did not need “the added worry of filling out tax forms.”144 
 
 140. See, e.g., Editorial, Tax Cuts, Again, WASH. POST, May 11, 2006, at A26; Editorial, Tax 
Cut Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at A36; Kevin Phillips, A Tax Plan Rooted in the 
Bush Pedigree, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at M1. 
 141. And indeed, when, in connection with the hurricanes, Congress attempted to address a 
provision designed to help the working poor, the refundable earned income tax credit, it 
provided relief so complicated and impracticable as to boggle the mind. Francine Lipman, 
KETRA and GOZA: Relief From the Rubble or Another Disaster Waiting to Happen to Low-
Income Individuals?, Presentation at the Am. Bar Ass’n Tax Section Meeting (Feb. 4, 2006) 
(materials on file with author). Former President Clinton has announced that his foundation is 
launching a major initiative to help Katrina victims determine whether they qualify for the 
credit. See Clinton Foundation Programs: EITC Awareness Program, http://www. 
clintonfoundation.org/cf-pgm-ee-eitc.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2006). 
 142. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 270 
(1983). 
 143. Sen. George Allen, Allen Bill Would Fully Exempt Attack Victims from Estate Tax, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 27, 2001, LEXIS, 2001 TNT 188-42. 
 144. Id. 
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Given such a weak justification, his proposal, unsurprisingly, did not 
find its way into the legislation as passed. But President Bush used 
the opportunity to score rhetorical points in this ongoing wealth-
transfer tax battle: when he signed VTTRA into law, the presidential 
release described the law as providing “Lower Death Tax Rates for 
Victims,” choosing the name adopted by opponents of the estate tax 
to describe it.145 Similarly, the presidential release explains that 
VTTRA shields the first $8.5 million of a victim’s estate from the 
“federal death tax.”146 
At least some of the compromise suggestions offered in “reform” 
of the estate tax remarkably resemble the estate tax provisions of 
VTTRA: current reports and predictions of possible compromises for 
the estate tax speculate on a maximum rate not unlike that in 
VTTRA.147 Disaster relief again provided some in Congress with a 
means to advance its tax legislative agenda, but to do so with little if 
any attention or opposition. 
IV.  CAN A BETTER APPROACH BE INSTITUTIONALIZED? 
The foregoing may suggest that the authors cannot imagine 
disaster-relief provisions that Congress ought not either generalize to 
a broader range of victims or eschew altogether. That is not the case, 
however. There are relief provisions that can be justified by the 
special circumstances that surround major disasters, and which vary 
somewhat, depending on the nature of the disaster. 
KETRA again provides some useful examples. Among its many 
provisions are at least a few that seem reasonably tailored to special 
needs prevailing within the Katrina disaster area. For example, one 
provision extends from two years to five years the period within 
which a taxpayer can replace destroyed property with similar 
 
 145. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: 
THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005). 
 146. Press Release, The White House, supra note 64. 
 147. Thus, for example, at the same time that then-Secretary of the Treasury John Snow 
stated that the White House would push for repeal of the “pernicious” estate tax, Senate 
Finance Committee Chair Charles Grassley commented that votes for full repeal were not there 
and that a compromise was much more likely, suggesting a compromise package of a $5 million 
exemption and 15 percent rate. Emily Dagostino, Snow Praises Tax Cuts, Looks Next to Estate 
Tax Repeal, TAX NOTES TODAY, May 15, 2006, LEXIS, 2006 TNT 93-1. 
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property, without recognizing any gain on the destroyed property.148 
(Such gain can occur, for example, where appreciated property was 
insured for its replacement costs, which may exceed the taxpayer’s 
basis in the property.) This rule seems to respond to a legitimate 
difference between property destroyed by a tornado in Missouri and 
similar property in Louisiana destroyed by Hurricane Katrina: in 
Missouri, a taxpayer whose property is destroyed may be able to find 
any number of similar properties by reference to the classified section 
of a local newspaper. But if a taxpayer would like to replace a 
destroyed shop in New Orleans with another that would continue the 
same business, with as much of the preexisting going concern value 
(good will among customers, suppliers, etc.), the taxpayer would not, 
for some extended period, even have been able to find a newspaper, 
much less advertisements for suitable properties in the area. One can 
never be sure that a five-year period rather than a two-year period 
captures the distinction in need precisely, but at least it is clear that a 
longer replacement period is reasonable under circumstances of wide-
spread devastation. 
Similarly, KETRA contains a provision that allows prehurricane 
employers a 40 percent credit for wages paid to prehurricane 
employees who are retained following the disaster.149 This is strikingly 
generous in an absolute sense, but again seems arguably justified by 
the difficulties of continuing business in an area in which so much of 
the basic business infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed. 
One can reasonably debate whether some system of direct grants 
would have been preferable to the use of a tax credit, but at least this 
provision seems reasonably explicable by the special circumstances 
surrounding the Katrina disaster. 
As we have indicated, it may be appropriate to allow taxpayers 
to make withdrawals from retirement accounts to enable them to 
afford repairs following disasters, and possibly to replenish those 
accounts within some time period following recovery from the 
 
 148. See I.R.C. § 1033 (2000) (listing background rules); see also Katrina Emergency Tax 
Relief Act (KETRA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-73, § 405, 119 Stat. 2016 (2005) (listing 
modifications). 
 149. KETRA § 202. There was no background provision; as the Joint Committee 
explanation of the Act dryly notes in its description of present (pre-enactment) law: “There is 
no employer tax credit for wages paid solely by reason of such wages being paid by employers in 
connection with a disaster area.” STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 3768, “THE HURRICANE KATRINA TAX RELIEF ACT OF 
2005” AS AMENDED BY THE SENATE ON SEPT. 15, 2005, at 13 (Comm. Print 2005). 
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disaster. This special withdrawal rule might be tied to the current 
rules of section 165(h), which allows deduction of casualty losses to 
the extent that they exceed 10 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income. The rule could thus be that if and to the extent that a 
taxpayer reasonably believes that repair costs will exceed 10 percent 
of her adjusted gross income, she may withdraw such sums from 
certain qualified retirement accounts without penalty. This approach 
would mean that a taxpayer could make such withdrawals whether 
the damage occurred due to a huge natural disaster, a terrorist attack, 
or a very localized and relatively unnewsworthy storm, as long as the 
amount of economic damage exceeded the stated threshold. 
Similarly, not every provision of VTTRA is subject to the 
criticisms made in the previous section. Several provisions of that Act 
applied to disasters more generally and are, in part for that reason, 
somewhat more defensible than the provisions making the victims of 
terrorism into soldiers. They too, however, are not free of 
problematic aspects. 
One important provision in VTTRA supplies a useful example: 
section 102 gave the Secretary of the Treasury expanded authority to 
postpone deadlines for filing returns, paying taxes, filing a claim for 
credit or refund of tax, and other procedural actions.150 This provision 
expanded the suspension period from 120 days to one year. It 
included within the secretary’s authority a number of filing 
requirements related to pension plans and gave authority to postpone 
requirements for any other act, such as the time requirement for a 
tax-free exchange under section 1031.151 It permitted the secretary to 
postpone actions in response to a terrorist or military action, 
regardless of whether a disaster area has been declared by the 
president in connection with the action. It allows the secretary to 
announce such extensions via a notice or other mechanism rather 
than requiring time-consuming regulations. This provision, 
particularly the longer period of time, proved its use when the 
hurricanes struck. It exemplifies a necessary and pragmatic response 
to a geographical disaster, where large numbers of taxpayers may be 
 
 150. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (VTTRA), Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 102, 115 
Stat. 2427 (2001), I.R.C. § 7508A, and new § 518 and § 4002 of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974. 
 151. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001” AS PASSED BY THE 
HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 21 (Comm. Print 2001). 
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more or less similarly situated, and in need of administrative relief. 
Although it is true that individual taxpayers may in some 
circumstances also need filing extensions, and similar sorts of 
administrative relief, there are mechanisms for providing such 
relief,152 and it makes sense that such individual relief be handled on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than on the basis of residence within an 
area impacted by a disaster. 
Another provision, codified as section 139, also applied to 
disasters more generally and expanded the Secretary of the 
Treasury’s authority to declare a disaster. It excluded from income 
not only payments from the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund, but also all “qualified disaster relief payments.”153 These 
include payments for any reasonable and necessary personal, family, 
living, or funeral expenses incurred as a result of a qualified disaster, 
as well as any payments for the repair or rehabilitation of a personal 
residence, or for the repair or replacement of its contents, to the 
extent that such repairs or replacements are not covered by 
insurance. A qualified disaster includes a presidentially-declared 
disaster, or any disaster which results from a terrorist or military 
action, an accident involving a common carrier, or from any other 
event which would be determined by the secretary to be of a 
catastrophic nature. For purposes of payments made by a federal, 
state, or local government, it also includes disasters designated by 
federal, state, or local authorities. Legislative history also clarified 
that employer-controlled foundations could make grants to their 
employees to relieve distress from a qualified disaster. So long as the 
grants are based on an “objective determination of need” using such 
procedures as an independent selection committee, they would not 
violate the tax law requirements, including the prohibition on self-
dealing, applicable to section 501(c)(3) private foundations.154 
 
 152. For example, individuals can routinely request extensions of filing deadlines due to 
extraordinary personal circumstances under I.R.C. § 6081, and the IRS routinely grants such 
relief. In addition, the IRS is authorized by I.R.C. § 7508A to prescribe periods of up to 120 
days during which filing obligations may be suspended in the case of presidentially-declared 
disasters. 
 153. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 111, 15 Stat. 2432 
(2002); I.R.C. § 139 (2000). 
 154. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001” AS PASSED BY THE 
HOUSE AND THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 17–19 (Comm. Print 2001). 
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Section 139 codifies and thus clarifies the amorphous general 
welfare exception,155 and Congress did well to think beyond the 
immediate terrorist attacks in enacting section 139 and in addressing 
problems exposed by the attacks. It makes clear, for example, that 
grants from FEMA are excluded from income. It has proven 
particularly useful in connection with employer-sponsored private 
foundations.156 This sort of legislation represents exactly the sort of 
more generalized thinking about tax relief based on special 
circumstances that should be encouraged. Congress should consider 
all circumstances it can imagine that might deserve relief of particular 
sorts, and write rules that can be applied across a range of 
circumstances that are similar in salient ways. 
Further, these provisions, by allowing administrative invocation 
of the predicate for relief rather than requiring congressional action 
in each new instance, accomplish two important objectives: First, they 
permit relief to be granted within a much shorter response time. As 
soon as Treasury officials verify the nature of the disaster, the relief 
provisions can be put in place.157 Second, they permit an 
administrative process to unfold, under which Treasury can impose 
on itself standards and guidelines that will make it more likely that 
the relief will be granted in ways that are appropriate to each 
situation. 
Nonetheless, aspects of section 139 are troubling. By not 
excluding from income payments for any expenses compensated for 
by insurance or otherwise, it gives an incentive for taxpayers not to 
insure for replacement value. By itself, this might be a minor quibble, 
in light of the fact that the casualty loss deduction provisions embody 
the same moral hazard.158 But the provisions of section 139 go a bit 
 
 155. See Rev. Rul. 98-19, 1998-1 C.B. 840; Rev. Rul. 76-144, 1976-1 C.B. 17. In Rev. Rul. 
2005-46, 2005-30 I.R.B. 1, however, the Service ruled that disaster grants to businesses from a 
state program were not excluded from income as a gift, under the general welfare exception or 
under § 139. 
 156. See Internal Revenue Service, IRS Designates South Asia Earthquake as Qualified 
Disaster, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 26, 2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 206-8; see also Internal Revenue 
Service, Tsunami Deemed ‘Qualified Disaster’ for Tax Purposes, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28, 
2005, LEXIS, 2005 TNT 38-6. 
 157. See supra note 156. 
 158. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) generally allows deductions for damages, whether repaired or not, 
that arise from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty” or from theft. The deduction is subject 
to a floor equal to ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, which bars deduction of 
relatively small losses. In the disaster scenario, however, the ten percent limitation may be less 
significant, in light of the large losses that individuals tend to sustain in those cases. 
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beyond the casualty loss deduction rules, leveraging the moral hazard 
into new ranges. Although it does not exclude payments in the nature 
of income replacement, the legislative history provides that “in light 
of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding a qualified disaster, it 
is anticipated that individuals will not be required to account for 
actual expenses in order to qualify for the exclusion, provided that the 
amount of the payments can be reasonably expected to be 
commensurate with the expenses incurred.”159 As a result, owner-
employees could well use their corporations as a self-insurance 
mechanism for their personal disaster relief. That is, rather than 
purchasing insurance against natural disasters, owner-employees 
could instead make tax-free section 139 payments to themselves if 
and when a disaster occurs. 
Limiting the exclusion to qualified disasters is also troubling. 
Should an employer or an employer-sponsored foundation choose to 
provide assistance to an individual employee who lost a home to fire 
or storm, section 139 will not protect such payments, because the 
disaster would not be a qualified disaster. In sum, in enacting section 
139, Congress looked beyond the particular major disaster facing the 
country, but did not extend its vision to consider the relevance of its 
relief to the individualized disasters that occur each and every day. 
Contemplating future disasters, however, leads us to suggest a 
procedural change for section 139. Section 139 delegates to the 
president or the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to declare 
disasters. In an ideal world, this would be sensible, because the 
executive branch can act more quickly than Congress ever can. In the 
real world, however, Congress will likely always feel that it needs to 
act when disaster strikes. In order to preserve a role for Congress, 
section 139 and other special disaster provisions should require that 
Congress invoke those provisions by adoption of a joint resolution 
declaring a disaster. Joint resolutions can be passed quickly in the 
face of disaster, and if the substantive provisions so invoked have 
been carefully considered in advance, sound tax policy need not be 
sacrificed to achieve a quick and dramatic result. 
We further urge policymakers to consider a different kind of 
justification for disaster aid and thus to develop a different set of 
 
 159. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION 
OF THE “VICTIMS OF TERRORISM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2001” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE AND 
THE SENATE ON DEC. 20, 2001, at 16 (Comm. Print 2001). 
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business tax incentives for areas hit by disasters. The Congressional 
Research Service has suggested that 
aid to devastated areas by the federal government may be viewed as 
an implicit form of insurance—the country as a whole acts to spread 
the risk of the cost of natural disasters. . . . In particular, the cost to 
businesses in a catastrophe exceeds the loss of property (which can 
be covered by insurance) because the business also loses its 
customer base and work force, and it is difficult for private insurance 
markets to provide coverage for this type of loss.160 
The credit for wages to pre-disaster employees we endorse provides 
exactly this sort of aid. We recommend that Congress consider other 
similar sorts of tax provisions—perhaps a credit for advertising 
expenses for some period after a disaster, or accelerated amortization 
of section 197 intangibles for preexisting businesses in the disaster 
area. Designing tax relief in such a way, rather than enacting a 
laundry list of business tax incentives, will help to match the 
irresistible congressional impulse to respond to disasters with tax 
provisions more directly targeted at the disaster. 
More generally, there may be actions that can be taken to 
restrain the tendency of Congress toward uneven and somewhat 
excessive tax relief in response to disasters. One possible model 
would be the one that Congress has, in effect, already adopted with 
respect to the costly problem of lost revenue due to inter-company 
pricing schemes between and among related taxpayers engaged in 
international trade.161 Congress has enacted a very simple and general 
rule, only a few sentences long, granting the commissioner authority 
in his discretion to restate a taxpayer’s income and expense items “in 
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income [of 
 
 160. Gravelle, supra note 138; see also Terrence Chorvat & Elizabeth Chorvat, Income Tax 
as Implicit Insurance Against Losses from Terrorism, 36 IND. L. REV. 425, 425–26 (2003) (“[T]he 
income tax system provides a certain level of implicit insurance, which emanates from 
provisions that allow for deduction of losses and, in some instances, deduction of insurance 
payments, as well as the exclusion of recoveries from insurance companies or the tortfeasors 
themselves.”). Some of the provisions Congress has enacted, such as requiring reduction of tax-
free disaster payments to the extent a disaster-related expense is compensated by insurance, 
may well be best explained on such a basis. 
 161. For example, if X Corporation is a U.S. multinational corporation with a subsidiary in 
Ireland (which has generally lower corporate income tax rates), it may find that it can 
advantageously sell its products to its Irish subsidiary at prices that barely cover its costs, 
allowing the Irish subsidiary to resell the products in Europe at higher prices. The profits 
derived from the sale of these goods would then appear on the Irish subsidiary’s income 
statement rather than the income statement of the U.S. parent. 
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the taxpayer].”162 The Treasury regulations, in contrast, are 
voluminous.163 The control achieved over tax avoidance through inter-
company pricing arrangements is less than perfect, but one imagines 
that it is far better than could be achieved through the more 
cumbersome legislative process. 
Something similar could be done with respect to tax relief in 
response to all disasters. That is, Congress could expand the kind of 
authority it has already given to the commissioner to postpone filing 
deadlines under section 518 or declare disasters under section 139. It 
could delegate to the commissioner not only authority to suspend 
filing burdens, but also to toll the running of limitations on 
reinvestment of insurance proceeds in similar property, excuse the 
imposition of penalty taxes on withdrawals from retirement accounts, 
and so on. The Treasury could then promulgate regulations that 
would achieve the sort of consistency that the piecemeal legislative 
approach to disasters has not, and cannot. 
As a general solution, however, this approach seems unrealistic. 
The problem exists at least in part because of the “legislative 
imperative” discussed at the outset of this Article. Congress 
apparently feels vulnerable to possible charges that it has “done 
nothing” in the face of a national disaster, and it is institutionally 
unable—and increasingly so, it would appear—to resist defending 
itself in anticipation of those charges by enacting tax relief provisions, 
including ones of types that we have criticized. 
A more promising alternative might be to create a panel 
involving the staff of the several tax-policy agents within the 
executive and legislative branches: in particular, the Internal Revenue 
Service, the Treasury Department’s Office of Tax Policy, and the 
Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress. The panel, in 
consultation with the non-tax federal agencies and Congressional 
committees with disaster-relief responsibilities, could be charged with 
providing guidelines for tax relief measures that Congress may choose 
to consider in response to future major disasters. In particular, we 
suggest that such a panel might identify three categories of relief 
provisions, more or less along the lines we have indicated in this 
Article. 
 
 162. I.R.C. § 482. 
 163. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-0 to 1.482-9, including proposed regulations, run to more than 200 
pages in length in 8 U.S. Tax Rep. (RIA). 
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The first category would consist of provisions that should 
probably be available for all disasters, large and small, on an 
equitable basis. As discussed, one such example would be special IRA 
withdrawal rules in the case of a disaster and five-year carryback of 
net operating losses. The panel would undoubtedly come up with 
other possible provisions. 
The second category would consist of those provisions that 
should rarely if ever be invoked in response to a disaster. An example 
of such a provision might be those that effectively exempt estates 
from all estate tax liability, regardless of the size of the estate. As we 
have explained, there is simply no policy justification for the idea that 
the estates of very wealthy decedents should be immune to the usual 
estate tax liabilities simply because the decedent died in a particular 
sort of disaster. 
The third category would consist of things that should be to some 
degree customized to fit the particular disaster, but within guidelines 
that the panel could develop. For example, we concur with Congress 
that the scope of some disasters is such that longer periods may be 
necessary for reinvestment of insurance proceeds in property similar 
to property that may have been destroyed, because the damaged 
infrastructure and heightened local demand for materials and labor 
make the standard periods inadequate.164 The panel could develop 
guidelines for such customization. For example, it might suggest that 
if less than five percent of the housing units within an affected county 
or metropolitan area were damaged or destroyed in the particular 
disaster, the reinvestment window should not exceed the four years 
already allowed in the case of presidentially-declared disasters.165 If 
more than five percent but less than ten percent of the housing units 
were damaged or destroyed, then the reinvestment period could be as 
long as five years.166 Similar rules could be developed for wage credits, 
credits for advertising expenses, and section 197 amortization. 
 
 164. I.R.C. § 1033 generally allows taxpayers to defer recognition of gain on recoveries 
(through insurance or otherwise) with respect to damaged or destroyed property if those 
recovered amounts are reinvested in property that is similar to the property that was damaged 
or destroyed. The baseline period for such reinvestments is two years under § 1033(a)(2)(B), but 
a four-year period is available in the case of presidentially-declared disasters under  
§ 1033(h). 
 165. § 1033(h). 
 166. We have no expertise in disaster relief, and so we offer these examples with great 
diffidence, as purely hypothetical possibilities that might emerge from the panel process. 
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Guidelines of this sort obviously produce no more than soft 
constraints; Congress would be free to disregard them when it chose, 
and it might choose to do so with some frequency. But if even some 
constraint is achieved through this process, it would be better than 
none at all. Guidelines of this sort would establish presumptions, 
obligating a member of Congress who proposes to disregard them to 
offer compelling explanations of why it would be appropriate to do 
so. The guidelines would also provide some cover for members who 
may wish to protect the integrity of the fisc, without undue fear that 
they will be portrayed as heartless and uncaring in their next 
campaigns for resisting their colleagues’ efforts to create tax 
expenditures unwisely. Finally, creation of the panel would by itself 
draw some attention to the problem of excessive use of tax relief 
measures as a response to disasters, which may have salutary effects 
at least in the short run. 
CONCLUSION 
In our view, the nature of the problem presented explains the 
public response. The disasters were vividly, unceasingly presented in 
the media day and night; they were easy for the public to understand, 
and difficult to put out of mind. The entire nation identified with the 
victims and resonated with fear that a manmade or natural disaster 
would afflict their own families and communities as well. Enormous 
sympathy and anxiety clouded public vision. 
That Congress and the public may well have been acting 
altruistically—at least, mostly so—did not produce good tax policy. 
Citizens and members of Congress, eager and pressured to act, did 
not think—and, truly, did not want to think—about the efficacy in 
restoring destroyed neighborhoods or the equity of their actions in 
that tax benefits would favor the wealthier among those in the 
affected areas, rather than less wealthy taxpayers who suffer 
individual, isolated disasters. Sympathy, it would appear, 
systematically distorts tax policy in this way. 
The nation has witnessed at least four major tax acts responding 
to disasters in the last five years. It seems reasonable to fear that 
Congress is likely to perpetuate this pattern with future disasters 
unless the institutional landscape is somehow altered. We have 
offered some ideas that we believe would alter that landscape. In 
order for Congress to inoculate itself against a distorting sympathy 
unleashed by a particular disaster, we urge Congress to take two 
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kinds of immediate actions. First, it should identify those provisions 
enacted in response to the recent disasters that make sense generally, 
such as five-year carryback of net operating losses, and amend the tax 
code to adopt these rules generally. Second, it should identify those 
provisions needed in particular when a whole area is devastated—a 
five-year period for replacing destroyed property, a credit for wages 
to pre-disaster employees, and routine extensions of filing 
deadlines—and, following the model of section 139, make them 
available to any declared disaster area. 
We also urge two kinds of longer-term approaches. One is to 
consider and evaluate disaster tax relief provisions as a kind of 
national insurance against disasters that the private market does not 
supply. The other is to convene a panel to develop packages of tax 
relief for different kinds of disasters, for Congress to have available to 
invoke when needed. We urge Congress to consider these and other 
approaches immediately, before another disaster strikes, because they 
can be reasonably evaluated only outside the context of any particular 
disaster. 
